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Abstract
Suppose you are competing in an online sealed bid auction for some goods. How
do you know the auction result can be trusted? The auction site could be per-
forming actions that support its own commercial interests by blocking certain
bidders or even reporting incorrect winning prices. This problem is magnified
when the auctioneer is an unknown party and the auctions are for high value
items. The incentive for the auctioneer to cheat can be high as they could stand
to make a significant profit by inflating winning prices or by being paid by a cer-
tain bidder to announce them the winner. Verification of auction results provides
confidence in the auction result by making it computationally infeasible for an
auction participant to cheat and not get caught. This thesis examines the con-
struction of verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocols. Two
verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocols are produced by
extending existing auction protocols.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Online auctions have grown into a widely accepted way of trading goods and
services. Auctions are a high profile method for consumer goods to be traded
with the New Zealand auction site TradeMe having over one million items for
sale, over one and a half millionmembers, and has almost four hundred thousand
visitors every day [50]. Worldwide auction site eBay has 233 million registered
users that trade $1,839 US dollars worth of goods every second [14]. However, its
not just consumer goods that are being traded using online auctions. In the USA,
the Federal Communications Commission uses online auctions to sell licenses
for electromagnetic spectrum [15] and, in the UK, the Office of Communications
intends to use an online auction to sell licenses for 215MHz of spectrum [40].
Online auctions are a pervasive mechanism used by individuals, businesses, and
governments to trade goods and services.
Combinatorial auctions are a special type of auction where bidders can place
bids on combinations of goods as opposed to a single good auction. This en-
ables bidders to take advantage of any synergistic value of goods. In a three good
auction, a bidder could place a bid on good 1 only if they can also get good 2,
so good 1 and good 2 together. Online combinatorial auctions have been used
extensively to allocate truckload transportation in the United States where, by
2003, half a dozen software packages were available to facilitate the combina-
torial auction of trucking routes [12]. These include OptiBid [35], Transportation
Bid Collaborator [27], and others. The average annual value of transportation ser-
vices auctioned in the period from 1997 to 2001 was $175 million US Dollars [12].
Online combinatorial auctions also have been used extensively for industrial pro-
curement auctions. Mars Incorporated found a forty minute auction replaced a
1
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BobJim Sam
$3 {apples and oranges} $1 {apples}$1 {oranges}
$1 {Bananas}
Auctioneer
$3 {apples, oranges and bananas}
Figure 1.1: Example Combinatorial Auction
negotiation process that lasted over two weeks and required nine separate plane
trips [12].
Figure 1.1 shows an example of a combinatorial auction where Jim wants ap-
ples only if he can also have oranges, Bob wants any subset of the goods, while
Sam needs all three of the goods. The highest revenue for the auctioneer ($4) is
generated by allocating the apples and oranges to Jim and the bananas to Bob.
1.1 The Auction Trust Problem
Suppose Alice is running a sealed bid auction of artwork for a charity organisa-
tion. She plans to hold the auction on her web site hosted by Sam. Bob and Jim
submit bids to the auctioneer as shown in Figure 1.2.
There are several potential problems with this auction:
• Either Sam or Alice can peek at the bids. Many bidders prefer their bids to
remain private especially in a competitive environment where bids are com-
mercially sensitive information, alternately the bid values could be passed
on to a competing bidder so they can make sure their bid is slightly higher.
• Alice could refuse to count certain bidders in the auction. Alice could act in
collusion with a malicious bidder to make sure a competing bidder never
has a bid counted in the auction.
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Figure 1.2: Art Auction
• Alice could arbitrarily choose a winner regardless of the bid values, the
motivation for this is especially high if Alice is colluding with the bidder
chosen as the winner.
• Alice could easily defraud the charity organisation by reporting a reduced
winning price, and taking the difference herself.
A large amount of trust is placed in Alice with no way of checking whether she
has correctly executed the auction. In current systems this trust is often placed in
a central organisation such as TradeMe or the Federal Communications Commis-
sion.
Alice can be prevented from breaking privacy guarantees by using a privacy
preserving auction where the values of bids are hidden using encryption or ob-
fuscation yet can still be compared to find the winner. Figure 1.3 shows Alice
holding a privacy preserving sealed bid auction on her web site hosted by Sam.
Bob and Jim submit encrypted bids to the auctioneer.
In this auction, Alice and Sam are prevented from being able to peek at bids
due to the obfuscation of bid values. This prevents sensitive information leaking
to competing bidders. There has been a large amount of work in the area of secure
auctions, starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [16]. Auction protocols
have been developed that are capable of conducting auctions involving multiple
goods and bidders all while using cryptographic techniques to keep losing bid
values secret from both auctioneers and other bidders.
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Figure 1.3: Privacy Preserving Art Auction
The possible auction attacks informally discussed so far can be divided in to
the following categories:
• Insider trading: The auctioneer misuses information about current auction
state (i.e. current valuations) for competitive advantage. This information
could be provided (possibly sold) to a bidder in a sealed bid auction so the
bidder can bid the minimum possible to win.
• Private information revelation: The auctioneer gathers a history of informa-
tion such as minimum bids for use in future auctions. This information may
be used to set unfair reserve prices or sold to some interested party.
• Bid filtering: The auctioneer drops bids based on personal interests.
• Malicious auctioneer: The auctioneer calculates an incorrect auction result.
The auctioneer could announce a bidder as the winner regardless of bid val-
ues, or force the auction to calculate incorrect winning price/s or bidder/s.
Privacy preserving auction protocols address insider trading and private in-
formation revelation. By using encrypted bids that cannot be opened until after
the end of the bid submission phase, the auctioneer is prevented from insider
trading. The auctioneer either cannot open the encrypted bids, or when it can
open the bids, it is too late to use the information on the auction state. Privacy
preserving auctions keep losing bid values secret which prevents information
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revelation other than the information that has to be made public, such as the
winning bidders and prices.
Verification prevents bid filtering and a malicious auctioneer. In a verifiable
auction, bidders check that their bids have been counted in the auction to pre-
vent bid filtering. Bidders can also check that the auction process has executed
correctly to prevent a malicious auctioneer.
1.2 Security Goals
Verification protocols for privacy preserving auctions have the following security
goals:
1. Bidders, auctioneers, or any third party should be able to verify the actions
of the participants in the auction protocol giving a high confidence that the
auction participants have correctly executed the auction.
2. Verification of the auction protocol should reveal no information other than
what is revealed by the auction protocol.
3. It should be computationally infeasible for a bidder to submit an invalid bid
that passes the verification checks.
4. It should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to not count all the
bids and pass the verification checks.
5. It should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to announce an
incorrect winning bidder(s) or price(s) and pass the verification checks.
1.3 Thesis Goals
The goal of this thesis is to create a verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial
auction protocol. Privacy preserving auction protocols prevent insider trading
and private information revelation and verifiable auction protocols prevent bid
filtering and a malicious auctioneer. Combinatorial auctions are a useful tool
for trading goods and services as shown by the examples presented in the intro-
duction. There has been a significant amount of research work done on secure
auctions starting with the work by Franklin and Reiter [16] and this thesis aims
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to investigate this work, identify solutions or techniques, and use them to build
a verifiable privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocol.
1.4 Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are:
1. Producing a taxonomy of current privacy preserving auction protocols pro-
viding a useful way to classify and discuss current solutions. The taxonomy
of cryptographically secure auctions produced for this thesis reveals that
there is no existing privacy preserving auction protocol for combinatorial
auctions. Two possible alternatives suggest themselves:
(a) Extend an existing verifiable privacy preserving auction protocol to
compute combinatorial auctions.
(b) Extend an existing privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocol
to be verifiable.
2. For alternative 1a the existing verifiable privacy preserving auction protocol
by Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner called garbled circuits [36] was identified and
extended to compute combinatorial auctions. This involved:
(a) The creation of a novel Boolean circuit that enables combinatorial auc-
tions to be conducted by the garbled circuits auction protocol. Previ-
ously garbled circuits had only been used to conduct first price and
(M+1) priced auctions,
(b) The implementation of the garbled circuits protocol and the combina-
torial Boolean circuit, and
(c) A performance analysis showing the performance of the garbled circuit
auction protocol when conducting combinatorial auctions.
3. For alternative 1b an existing privacy preserving combinatorial auction pro-
tocol by Suzuki and Yokoo [53] was identified and extended to be verifiable
using zero knowledge proofs. This involved:
(a) The design of a public and group verification protocol using exist-
ing zero knowledge proofs to verify the various steps of the auction.
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The public verification protocol makes use of existing zero knowledge
proofs and combines them in a novel way,
(b) The implementation of the group verification protocol and applying it
to an existing implementation of the privacy preserving auction proto-
col,
(c) A security analysis and tests to confirm that the group verification pro-
tocol does indeed detect a party not keeping to the correct auction pro-
tocol, and
(d) A performance analysis showing the overhead of the group verifica-
tion protocol when compared to the performance of the original proto-
col.
1.5 Thesis Organisation
This thesis begins by presenting a taxonomy of existing secure auction protocols
in Chapter 2 to detail the related work in this area. Chapter 3 goes into more
detail about zero knowledge proofs as well as presenting a detailed look at the
auction protocol by Suzuki and Yokoo [53]. The work extending garbled circuits
to compute combinatorial auctions is in Chapter 4. The group verification proto-
col to verify the result of the auction protocol by Suzuki and Yokoo is presented
in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 details the public verification protocol to verify the re-
sult of the auction protocol by Suzuki and Yokoo. An analysis of the security
of these verification protocols is presented in Chapter 7 and an analysis of the
performance of the auction protocols is presented in Chapter 7. Conclusions and
future work complete this thesis in Chapter 8.
8 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2
Secure Auction Taxonomy
Peng, Boyd, Dawson and Viswanathan have published their view of desirable
properties of privacy preserving online auctions [44] that can be used to classify
and discuss different auction protocols:
• Correctness. The auction winner(s) and the winning price(s) is calculated
correctly.
• Confidentiality. Bids are kept private before the bid opening phase.
• Fairness. A submitted bid cannot be modified, or denied.
• Price Flexibility. Allow bidders to bid any amount between the minimum
and maximum price and not just an item in a limited set of allowed bids.
• Verifiability. The result of the auction can be checked.
• Type Flexibility. The protocol supports a variety of auction types. For ex-
ample, first price or Vickrey auctions.
• Bid Privacy. The losing bids remain confidential, even after the auction has
ended.
• Bidder Anonymity. Identities of losing bidders kept secret.
• Robustness. Any malicious behaviour by any of the auction participants
cannot cause an incorrect auction result.
Using these desirable properties as a guide, a taxonomy of existing privacy
preserving online auctions has been constructed and is shown in Table 2.1. All the
9
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auction protocols studied have implemented the first three items in the list, cor-
rectness, confidentiality, and fairness. The taxonomy examines what other prop-
erties an auction protocol includes as well as how they have been implemented.
The taxonomy presents the auction protocols in chronological order starting with
the original paper by Franklin and Reiter.
2.1 Price Flexibility
The majority of the studied auction protocols do not provide price flexibility [2, 5,
10, 25, 26, 34, 36, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 53, 54]. Instead these auction protocols have a
pre-defined set of allowable bid prices for an auction. These prices do not have to
be linearly increasing and can provide higher bid precision for higher bids. It has
been argued that five hundred bid values should be sufficient for any auction [34].
Auction protocols by Franklin and Reiter [16], Kikuchi [31], Cachin [7], and
some of the models presented by Peng, Boyd, Dawson and Viswanathan [44] pro-
vide price flexibility which would provide a greater degree of flexibility to both
the bidders and the auctioneers. An auction protocol that does not implement
price flexibility would be able to emulate the behaviour of one that did simply
by providing enough possible bid prices. For example, in an auction for a good
that is expected to sell for one thousand dollars giving a bid range of one dollar
to three thousand dollars provides a similar degree of freedom to an auction with
full price flexibility. The capability of an auction protocol to provide a large num-




Group verifiability allows parties that were taking part in the auction to verify
the auction process. Group verification is a valuable tool that can give auction
participants confidence in the auction result.
The garbled circuit auction protocol by Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner [36] pro-
vides group verification. Bidders are able to verify that the auctioneer computed
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Auction Price Verifiable Support Bid Privacy Bid
Protocol Flex. Grp Pub Combin. Trust Model Level Anon.
Single Thresh 2 Pty 0 1 s *
Franklin [16]




2 Server X X X X
Garbled [36, 28]




Protocol X X X X
No [34]
Thresh. Trust X X X
Ext. Poly [48]
Protocol X X X
Homo. [53]
Protocol X X X
Extended [43]
HKT X X X X
Five [44]
Models X X X X X
SGVA [54]
Auction X X X
Yet [25]
Another X X X
Receipt [10]
Free X X X
Comb. [39, 38]
Bidder Res. X X X
GW [42]
Micali X X X
Verifiable [41]
Protocol X X X
Bidder [5]
Resolved X X X
Table 2.1: Secure Auction Taxonomy
12 CHAPTER 2. SECURE AUCTION TAXONOMY
the circuit given to it by the auction issuer, as well as verifying that their bid was
counted in the auction. The auctioneer is also able to verify that the correct circuit
was sent to it by the auction issuer. Group verification is provided using a variety
of techniques including cut and choose verification (discussed in Section 3.3.1).
Lipmaa, Asokan, and Niemi have developed a two party trust auction model
that provides similar group verification to garbled circuits [34]. The auctioneers
can verify that the bidders submitted correct bids, and the auctioneer can verify
the auction authority correctly computed the result to the auction. The group
verification for this protocol is provided using range proofs.
Finally Kikuchi has developed an auction protocol that uses verifiable secret
sharing to provide group verification [31]. Any participant can verify that the
auctioneers have correctly computed the auction result, and the auctioneers can
confirm that the bidders have submitted correct bids.
2.2.2 Public Verifiability
Public verifiability allows any third party to verify the auction process regardless
of whether they were taking part in the auction. Although the main focus of
verification is to give auction participants confidence in the auction result, public
verification could be used by a reputation service that verifies all the auctions and
keeps a reputation score depending on the number of auctions that an auctioneer
or bidder has been involved in that fail the verification.
Brandt’s bidder resolved auction protocol is publicly verifiable [5] using zero
knowledge proofs. Zero knowledge proofs are submitted with every action taken
by the bidders to calculate the auction result so a malicious bidder sending incor-
rect values is caught with a high probability.
Parkes, Rabin, Shieber, and Thorpe use a single auction server and rely on the
public verification of the auction process to assure that the auction server is not
corrupt [41]. This allows them to reduce the amount of communication overhead
of the protocol as the auction is executed entirely on one host.
It is interesting to note that group verification was used in the earlier papers
but on the later papers public verification is used.
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2.3 Type Flexibility
Several different auction types can be used to conduct an electronic auction. Some
of the more popular auction types are:
• First price auction. One good is available. The winning bidder bids the
highest amount for the good, and they pay the price they bid.
• Vickrey auction. One good is available. Thewinning bidder bids the highest
amount for the good, and they pay the price of the second highest bid.
• (M+1)st price auction. M goods are available. TheMwinning bidder bid the
M highest amounts for the good, and they pay the price of the M+1 highest
bid. A Vickrey auction is a special type of this auction where M=1.
• Combinatorial auction. N goods are available and bidders can bid on any
combination of the goods. The goods are allocated so as to maximise the
total price.
Some auction schemes support a variety of different auction types. For exam-
ple, the homomorphic auction protocol [53] can support first price, Vickrey, or
combinatorial auctions. Others, like Brandt’s bidder resolved auction, only sup-
port first price or the Vickrey auction [5]. Two of the auction protocols have been
extended to support combinatorial auctions. Brandt’s bidder resolved auction
protocol has been extended to support combinatorial auctions by Nzouonta [39,
38] and Kikuchi’s auction protocol was also extended to support combinatorial
auctions by Suzuki and Yokoo [48]. The original auction protocols both had veri-
fication that was lost when they were extended.
2.4 Bid Privacy Trust Model
To provide privacy in auctions, bids are encrypted or obfuscated in some way so
that losing bid values are kept secret. The trust model used by an auction protocol
is normally one of three basic trust models:
• Single Trusted Server.
• Threshold Trust.
• Two Party Trust.
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2.4.1 Single Trusted Server
The auction protocol by Parkes, Rabin, Shieber and Thorpe uses a single trusted
server that learns all the bid values after the bid submission phase [41]. The auc-
tion protocol concentrates on providing a public verification protocol so that even
if the auctioneer is malicious, bidders will detect if the auctioneer has incorrectly
calculated the auction result. Private information revelation is not prevented in
this auction protocol.
An auction protocol by Baudron and Stern also uses a single server but this
server is prevented from learning the losing bid values as long as it does not
collude with one of the bidders [2]. A malicious auctioneer in this protocol could
also sign up as a bidder and then be able to collude with itself and discover the
losing bid values.
Using a single server is practical as only one auctioneer needs to be found to
host the auction, but it does not provide robustness if the auctioneer fails in the
middle of the auction thus is not often employed.
2.4.2 Threshold Trust
In the threshold trust model, trust is shared among a set of hosts. Unless a certain
number (a quorum) of hosts are corrupt, the privacy of the protocol is preserved.
Threshold trust has been used in a large number of auction protocols [16, 5, 31,
39, 48, 53, 54].
The threshold trust model can be further broken down in to (t, n) threshold
schemes and (n, n) schemes. In (t, n) schemes, a number t out of n total servers
would need to be corrupt to compromise bid privacy. The threshold value t is
normally set to n/2 + 1. Common examples of values for (t, n) would be (2, 3) or
(3, 5). In (n, n) schemes all n hosts need to be corrupt to compromise bid privacy.
The (t, n) threshold model is used in the majority of auction protocols [16, 31,
39, 48, 53, 54] to distribute the trust among a group of n auctioneers. Although
it cannot be ruled out that t of the auctioneers are corrupt, the chances of them
being corrupt can be reduced by careful selection of the auctioneers. The auction-
eers should all be picked from different organisations, and should have different
attributes such as operating systems where possible.
Brandt’s bidder resolved auction model uses a (n, n) threshold trust model
where the trust is shared between the bidders [5]. This means that unless all the
bidders are corrupt bid privacy is preserved. If all bidders are corrupt it is impos-
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sible to preserve bid privacy as the bidders can share their private information
amongst themselves. This model provides greater security than the (t, n) model,
the bid privacy is preserved if even one of the bidders is honest.
Auction protocols using the (t, n) threshold trust model can achieve greater
robustness than protocols using either the (n, n) threshold trust, a single server,
or two party trust as they can tolerate up to n − t corrupt or failed auctioneers
and still be able to complete the auction. If an auction participant fails for some
reason in an auction protocol using a (n, n) threshold trust model, the auction
would need to restart because an (n, n) threshold trust model requires all n auc-
tion participants to decrypt the result of the auction.
2.4.3 Two Party Trust
In the two party trust model, trust is distributed between two separate parties.
Unless these two parties collude, bid privacy is preserved. The two parties should
be hosted by different organisations.
In the auction protocol of Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner the trust is distributed
between the auctioneer and an auction issuer [36]. The privacy of the bids is
preserved as long as these two parties do not collude. The auction issuer would
be a well known organisation, where as the auctioneer would not necessarily
be trusted by the bidders. This method allows for large numbers of untrusted
auctioneers to run auctions generated by a small number of well known auction
issuers. This is similar to the two party trust model used in an auction protocol
developed by Lipmaa, Asokan, and Niemi [34].
Another two party trust auction protocol uses two auction servers, where to-
gether the two auction servers create a semi ordered list of encrypted bids which
allows the identification of the highest bid [7]. The privacy of the bids is pre-
served as long as the two auction servers do not collude and as long as one of the
auction servers does not collude with a bidder.
It is easier to find two separate servers from separate organisations when us-
ing two party trust than it would be to find the n different servers needed to use
the threshold trust model. For this reason two party trust can be more practi-
cal than the threshold trust model but does not have the same robustness as the
auction cannot complete if one of the two servers fails.
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2.5 Bid Privacy Level
When bid privacy is implemented, it can provide different levels of privacy. These
levels of privacy can be grouped as follows:
• Level 0. No information except the winning bidder and the price they paid
are revealed.
• Level 1. Besides the information leakage of level 0, one other piece of in-
formation is revealed. For example, apart from the information revealed by
level 0, the fourth highest bid could also be revealed.
• Level s. Besides the information leakage of level 0, it is also possible to
recover bid statistics. For example, the maximum bid, the average bid, and
the standard deviation of bids.
• Level *. All of the bids are revealed to the auctioneer after the auction closes.
A bid privacy level of * as provided by two of the auction protocols [16, 41]
prevents insider trading as the auctioneer does not learn the the bid values until
the bid submission phase has finished, but it does not prevent private information
revelation as after the bid submission phase all the bids are revealed.
Both bid privacy level s and 1 prevent insider trading and may prevent pri-
vate information leakage depending on the statistics or piece of information be-
ing revealed. Only the suggested auction protocols by Peng, Boyd, Dawson and
Viswanathan [44] provide bid privacy level s. An auction protocol developed by
Cachin [7] provides bid privacy level 1 as it leaks a partial ordering of the bids
when the two auction servers are computing the result of the auction, however
insider trading is prevented as this partial ordering is only learned after the bid
submission phase has ended.
Bid privacy level 0 is the ideal case and is provided by most of the auction
protocols studied. A bid privacy level of 0 prevents insider trading as well as
private information revelation.
2.6 Bidder Anonymity
Two auction protocols developed by Peng, Boyd, Dawson and Viswanathan [44,
43] implement bidder anonymity. Bidder anonymity is achieved by adding an
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additional stage to the auction protocol during registration where bidders are
provided with anonymous ids to sign bids with. This stage could be added to the
other auction protocols mentioned above.
If both bidder anonymity and bid privacy are implemented, then no informa-
tion can be learned about losing bidders, not even who was taking part, unless
either the anonymity service or auction protocol is compromised. One of the
biggest problems with providing bidder anonymity is that if there is no way to
trace a bid to a bidder, then the winning bidder can repudiate on their bid. So
bidder anonymity needs to provide some way to link the winning bidder to their
bid if they do not acknowledge it is their bid, as well as stopping losing bidders
from claiming to have submitted the highest bid.
A group signature scheme has been suggested as a method to provide bidder
anonymity [51]. This is generated by two servers so that neither of the servers
knows the true link between bidder and signature. In the case of a bid needing
to be mapped to it’s real bidder, the two servers can co-operate to find the true
identity of the bidder from the bid’s signature.
Another method to provide bidder anonymity is to use use blind signatures
and a registration authority [44]. Bidders are issued a blind signature from the
registration authority, and can generate a pseudonym from this signature. If the
winning bidder does not identify themselves, all other bidders can prove using
a 1 out of n zero knowledge proof that the winning bid is not signed by them,
which will identify the winning bidder. One disadvantage of this scheme is that
if one other bidder refuses to take part in the 1 out of n proof, the winning bidder
cannot be identified.
For bidder anonymity to be effective, the bids must also be submitted through
an anonymous communication channel like a mix-net to prevent the IP address a
bid came from identifying the bidder.
2.7 Discussion
The goal of this thesis is to produce a privacy preserving, verifiable, combinato-
rial auction protocol with a bid privacy level of 0. Verification gives confidence in
the result of the auction and prevents bid filtering and the malicious auctioneer.
Support for combinatorial auctions provides a method to conduct the combinato-
rial auction examples provided in Chapter 1. Bid privacy of level 0 prevents both
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insider trading and private information revelation. None of the auction protocols
studied provides all these properties, but the current auction protocols can be ex-
tended to provide them. The rest of this thesis examines two possible alternatives,
extending a privacy preserving combinatorial auction to provide verification and
extending a verifiable privacy preserving auction protocol to conduct combinato-
rial auctions. The main body of work in this thesis is extending the combinatorial
auction protocol by Suzuki and Yokoo [53] to be verifiable. Adding verification to
this auction protocol makes it verifiable and capable of computing combinatorial
auctions with a bid privacy level of 0 using the threshold trust model. Previ-
ous work in this research group comparing auction protocols has also shown this
auction protocol to have better performance than the polynomial auction proto-
col [6]. Another major component of this thesis is the extension of the garbled
circuits auction protocol to compute combinatorial auctions. This extension will
mean that the garbled circuit auction protocol is verifiable and able to conduct
combinatorial auctions with a bid privacy level of 0 using two party trust. The
garbled circuit auction protocol was chosen as it is an interesting contrast to the
Suzuki and Yokoo auction protocol as it employs two party trust as opposed to




Before presenting the verification protocols for the homomorphic auction proto-
col, details of the zero knowledge proofs used to build the verification protocols
are presented as well as the details of the homomorphic auction protocol.
3.1 Zero Knowledge Proofs
Zero knowledge proofs were first introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rack-
off [22] and are used to prove the validity of some assertion, without revealing
any information other than the validity of the assertion. A zero knowledge proof
is a randomised protocol for two parties, a verifier and prover, in which the
prover wishes to convince the verifier of the validity of a given assertion [19].
A zero knowledge proof typically consists of a commitment from the prover, a
challenge from the verifier, and a response from the prover. They have been used
in many areas including smart cards [45], eVoting [11, 24], and electronic auc-
tions [5].
Figure 3.1 illustrates a famous zero knowledge proof known as Ali Baba’s
cave. The prover Alice wants to convince the verifier Bob that she knows the
secret password to open a locked door between R and S. To prove this while not
revealing the secret password used, Alice and Bob conduct the following steps:
• Bob waits at P while Alice goes to either R or S (commitment).
• Bob goes to Q so that Alice may not move from (R) to (S) other than by the
locked door (which she needs to know the secret to pass through) without
him knowing.
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Figure 3.1: Ali Baba’s Cave
• Bob chooses either the top (R) or bottom (S) tunnel.
• Bob challenges Alice to come out of the tunnel of his choice (challenge).
Alice can only exit the correct tunnel 100% of the time if she knows the
password.
• If Alice does not know the secret words, there is a 50% chance she will come
out from the wrong tunnel (response).
• Bob can then repeat this process as many times as he wants to convince
himself that Alice knows the secret word, but Bob will never learn the secret
word himself.
Ali Baba’s cave provides a good illustration of a zero knowledge proof. A
zero knowledge proof should have the properties of completeness, soundness,
and zero knowledge. Completeness is the probability that the proof will succeed
if the assertion being proved is valid. Soundness is the probability that the proof
will succeed if the assertion is not valid. Zero knowledge is the property of not
revealing any information other than the validity of the assertion being proved.
Ideally zero knowledge proofs have 100% completeness, 0% soundness, and per-
fect zero knowledge. Most proofs do not meet all these requirements, there is
normally a certain level of soundness greater than 0% which can often be im-
proved by repeating the proof multiple times. Zero knowledge proofs are not a
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proof in the mathematical sense, instead they are constructed in such a way that it
is infeasible for a cheating prover to publish a zero knowledge proof of an invalid
assertion.
The zero knowledge proof in Figure 3.1 has a completeness of 100% because if
Alice knows the secret password, she will always be able to pass the verification.
With a single execution of this proof the soundness is 50% as there is a 50% she
chose the right tunnel to go down and does not need the secret password. If the
proof is executed n times, the soundness is 1/2n.
A zero knowledge proof should yield nothing beyond the validity of the asser-
tion being proved. So anything that is feasibly computable from the proof is also
feasibly computable from the valid assertion. This property for zero knowledge is
formalised using the simulation paradigm. Informally, the simulation paradigm
states that an interactive proof A is zero knowledge on input x if for every feasi-
ble verifier strategy there exists a simulator S that on input x has output that is
indistinguishable from the output of A. The proof A is then zero knowledge as
the simulator S that is indistinguishable from A has no knowledge of anything
other than the input x and the validity of the assertion.
For the zero knowledge proofs presented in this thesis the completeness and
soundness of the proofs are examined. Simulators are also constructed to show
zero knowledge. All the mathematical operations in the next section are com-
puted modulo p in the group of integers Zp closed under multiplication unless
otherwise stated. The notation of E(M) = (A = gr, B = yrM) is used for the
homomorphic El-Gamal encryption, and B/Ax = M for the decryption where g
is a generator for the group Zp, q is some prime where q|p− 1 (q divides p− 1), x
is the secret key, and y = gx is the public key for El-Gamal encryption.
3.2 Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge
Interactive zero knowledge proofs require the prover to answer challenges sent
by the verifier to convince the verifier of the validity of the assertion being proved.
In our setting of auctions this is a disadvantage as it could require provers to in-
teract with verifiers for an indefinite time after the auction has been completed. A
participant in the auction protocol could become disconnected from the network
after the close of the auction or be busy conducting more auctions and be unable
to take part in the interactive verification.
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Non-interactive zero knowledge proofs [4] involve a prover publishing a proof
that can be verifiedwithout interactionwith the prover. The use of non-interactive
proofs frees up provers to either disconnect from the network or compute other
tasks after the close of the auction while still allowing verifiers to check the result
of the auction. Non-interactive zero knowledge proofs make use of a random
string or hash function available to both the prover and the verifier. In the imple-
mentation of the verification protocol, the cryptographic hash function SHA-512
is used as the hash function or random oracle for the zero knowledge proofs.
The SHA-512 hash function has an output space of 512 bits. When constructing
simulators for non-interactive zero knowledge proofs, it can be assumed that the
simulator can define the output of the random oracle for a certain input[3][24].
When constructing zero knowledge proofs using a random oracle they are secure
in the random oracle model.
The following proofs are used as building blocks for our verification protocols.
They are well known proofs that have been altered for this thesis from being in-
teractive, how they are normally presented, to being non-interactive using ideas
from Damgard [13] and Goldreich [19]. The completeness, soundness, and zero
knowledge of the proofs are presented in appendix A.
3.2.1 Proof of Knowledge of a Discrete Logarithm
The following is a non-interactive proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm.
The prover and verifier both know v and g, but only the prover knows x such
that v = gx, which is based on Schnorr’s Σ-protocol [45].
The prover, P , conducts the following steps using hash function H :
• P picks a random number z ∈R Zq.
• P computes a = gz.
• P computes c = H(a).
• P computes r = (z + cx) mod q.
• P then publicly publishes the proof transcript a and r.
The verifier, V , conducts the following steps using the same hash function H
and the proof transcript a and r:
• V computes c = H(a).
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• V accepts if gr = avc.
An Example - Proving an encrypted item decrypts to some value
An auctioneer may need to prove that an encrypted item decrypts to Z, but will
not want to reveal it’s secret key as that would enable the verifier to decrypt
any other values encrypted. If the item decrypts to Z, B/Ax = Z and therefore
B/Z = Ax. Now it is proved that the auctioneer knows x such that B/Z = Ax
where the values (A,B) and Z are known to both the auctioneer and the verifier.
This example uses the encryption parameters p = 23, q = 11, x = 2, y = 4, g =
2, and Z = 4. Now when r = 7, E(Z) = (27, 474) = (13, 9) and B/Z = 9/4 =
9 ∗ 6 = 8. Now the auctioneer can prove that B/Z = Ax.
The auctioneer, or prover P , conducts the following steps using hash function
H :
• P picks a random number z = 13.
• P computes a = gz = 1313 = 8.
• P computes c = H(a) = 6.
• P computes r = (z + cx) mod q = (13 + 2 ∗ 6) = 25 mod q = 3.
• P then publishes the proof transcript a and r.
The verifier, V , conducts the following steps using the same hash function H
and the proof transcript a and r:
• V computes c = H(a) = 6.
• V accepts if gr = avc where, in this example, v = B/Z. So V1 calculates
gr = 133 = 12 and avc = 8 ∗ 86 = 12 and checks they are equal.
3.2.2 Proof of Equality of Discrete Logarithms
The following is a non-interactive proof of equality of two discrete logarithms.
The prover and verifier both know v, w, g1 and g2, but only the prover knows x so
that v = gx1 and w = g
x
2 . It is based on a protocol from Chaum and Pederson [9].
This zero knowledge proof is used to conduct verifiable threshold El-Gamal de-
cryption in Section 5.3.1, and to prove the bid vectors are valid in Section 5.4 and
in Section 6.3.
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The prover, P , conducts the following steps using hash function H :
• P picks a random number z ∈R Zq.
• P computes a = gz1 and b = g
z
2 .
• P computes c = H(a+ b).
• P computes r = (z + cx) mod q.
• P publishes the proof transcript a, b, and r.
The verifier, V , conducts the following steps using the same hash function H
and the proof transcript a, b, and r:
• V computes c = H(a+ b).
• V checks that gr1 = av
c and gr2 = bw
c.
An Example - Raising an encrypted value to a Random Exponent
If an auctioneer raises a publicly known El Gamal encrypted value to a random
exponent, this proof can be used to prove the auctioneer knows the random value
used without revealing it. The original encryption of a value is E(M) = (A,B)
andwhen it is raised to an exponent e it becomesE(M)e = (Ae, Be) = (Aexp, Bexp).
The original valuesA,B and the resultsAexp, Bexp are known but only the auction-
eer knows e such that Aexp = A
e and Bexp = B
e.
This example uses the encryption parameters to p = 23, q = 11, x = 2, y =
4, g = 2, and z = 4. Now when r = 7, E(z) = (27, 474) = (13, 9). Now, say the
auctioneer raises the encryption to power of e = 9. Then (13, 9)9 = (139, 99) =
(3, 2). Now the auctioneer wishes to prove that it knows e without revealing it’s
value.
The auctioneer, or prover P , conducts the following steps using hash function
H :
• P picks a random number z = 15.
• P computes a = gz1 = 13
15 = 18 and b = gz2 = 9
15 = 6 and publishes them on
the bulletin board.
• P computes c = H(a+ b) = 21.
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• P computes r = (z+cx) mod q = (15+21∗9) = 204 mod q = 6 and publishes
it on the bulletin board.
• P publishes the proof transcript a, b, and r.
The verifier, V , conducts the following steps using the same hash function H
and the proof transcript a, b, and r:
• V computes c = H(a+ b) = 21.
• V checks that gr1 = av
c and gr2 = bw
c. So V calculates gr1 = 13
6 = 6 and
avc = 18 ∗ 321 = 6 and checks they are equal. V then calculates gr2 = 9
6 = 3
and bwc = 6 ∗ 221 = 3 and checks they are equal.
3.2.3 Proof an Encrypted Item Decrypts to 1 or Z
The following is a proof that an encrypted value E(M) = (A = gr, B = yrM)
either decrypts to a 1 or Z. It is based on a protocol from Cramer et al. [11]. This
zero knowledge proof is used to prove the bid vectors are valid in Section 5.4 and
in Section 6.3.
The prover, P , conducts the following steps using hash function H :
• If M = 1 P chooses r1, d1, w at random from Zq and calculates a1 = g
r1Ad1 ,
b1 = y
r1(B/Z)d1 , a2 = g
w and b2 = y
w. If M = Z P chooses r2, d2, w at
random from Zq and calculates a1 = g
w, b1 = y
w, a2 = g
r2Ad2 and b2 =
yr2Bd2 .
• P computes c = H(a1 + a2 + b1 + b2).
• IfM = 1 P calculates d2 = c − d1 mod q and r2 = w − rd2 mod q. IfM = Z
P calculates d1 = ci − d2 mod q and r1 = w − rd1 mod q.
• P publishes the proof transcript a1, a2, b1, b2, d1, d2, r1, and r2.
Now to verify that the encrypted value either decrypts to a 1 or Z, verify V
conducts the following steps using the same hash functionH , the encrypted value
(A,B) and the proof transcript a1, a2, b1, b2, d1, d2, r1, and r2:
• V computes c = H(a1 + a2 + b1 + b2).
• V checks that c = d1 + d2 mod q, a1 = g
r1Ad1 , b1 = y
r1(B/Z)d1 , a2 = g
r2Ad2 ,
and b2 = y
r2Bd2 .
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An Example - Verifying Correct Values in a Bid Vector
Suppose a bidder is submitting an encrypted bid vector. The number of possible
prices are k = 4, the public keys are p = 23, q = 11, g = 2, Z = 4, y = 4, and the
secret is x = 2. Suppose the bidder is bidding the second possible price, then the
bid vector is, bid = (E(Z), E(Z), E(1), E(1)). If the bid vector is encrypted using
r = 1, r = 2, r = 3, and r = 4 it equals bid = ((2, 16), (4, 18), (8, 18), (16, 3)). To
prove the item is either a 1 or Z the bidder proves the following for every item in
the bid vector which is proved here for the second item:
The prover, P , conducts the following steps using hash function H :
• M = Z so P chooses r2 = 1, d2 = 2, w = 3 at random and computes a1 = 8,
b1 = 18, a2 = 18 and b2 = 8.
• P computes c = H(a1 + a2 + b1 + b2) = 3.
• M = Z so P computes d1 = 1, d2 = 2, r1 = 1, r2 = 1.
• P publishes the proof transcript a1, a2, b1, b2, d1, d2, r1, and r2.
Now to verify that the encrypted value either decrypts to a 1 or a Z, verify
V conducts the following steps using the same hash function H , the encrypted
value (A,B) and the proof transcript a1, a2, b1, b2, d1, d2, r1, and r2:
• V computes c = H(a1 + a2 + b1 + b2) = 3.
• V checks that c = d1 + d2 mod q = 3, a1 = g
r1Ad1 = 8, b1 = y
r1(B/Z)d1 =
18, a2 = g
r2Ad2 = 18, b2 = y
r2Bd2 = 8.
3.2.4 Proof of Equality of Two Logarithm Lists
The following is a non-interactive proof of equality of two logarithm lists. The
prover and verifier both know n, v, w, g1, ..., gn andm1, ...,mn, but only the prover








i . It is based on a pro-
tocol from Chaum and Pederson [9]. It is used as Proof 4 in the Furukawa and
Sako proof of a valid shuffle of encrypted values [17] which is described in Sec-
tion 3.2.5.
The prover, P , conducts the following steps using hash function H :
• P picks n random numbers z1, ..., zn ∈R Zq.
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• P computes a1, ..., an where ai = g
zi
i and b1, ..., bn where bi = m
zi
i .
• P computes c = H(a1 + ...+ an + b1 + ...+ bn).
• P computes r1, ..., rn where ri = (zi + cxi) mod q.
• P publishes the proof transcript a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn and r1, ..., rn.
The verifier, V , conducts the following steps using the same hash function H
and the proof transcript a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn and r1, ..., rn:
• V computes c = H(a1 + ...+ an + b1 + ...+ bn).















An Example - Checking shuffled items use the same matrix and random inte-
gers for both A and B
If an auctioneer does a verifiable shuffle of bid vectors, it needs to prove that for
each of the shuffled items the same random integer and permutation matrix were
used. A shuffled value can be written as













where ri is the random integer used in the re-encryption of this item, and Mij is
a permutation matrix for the shuffle. The auctioneer needs to prove that for each
AShuffledi and BShuffledi the same ri andMij were used.
This can be proved for a two item bid vector by setting v = AShuffledi,
w = BShuffledi, n = 3, g1 = g, g2 = A1, g3 = A2, m1 = y, m2 = B1, m3 =
B2, x1 = ri, x2 = M1i, and x3 = M2i. Then let (Ai, Bi) = ((8, 3), (13, 8)) and






Now the auctioneer wishes to prove that it knows r1 and Mij without revealing
their values.
The auctioneer, A, conducts the following steps using hash function H :
• A picks random numbers z1 = 15, z2 = 7, and z3 = 4.
• A computes a1 = g
z1
1 = 2
15 = 16, a2 = g
z2
2 = 8
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• A then computes b1 = m
z1
1 = 4
15 = 3, b2 = m
z2
2 = 3




• A computes c = H(a1 + a2 + a3 + b1 + b2 + b3) = 10.
• A computes r1 = (z1 + cx1) mod q = (15 + 10 ∗ 6) = 75 mod q = 9.
• A computes r2 = (z2 + cx2) mod q = (7 + 10 ∗ 0) = 7 mod q = 7.
• A computes r3 = (z3 + cx3) mod q = (4 + 10 ∗ 1) = 14 mod q = 3.
• P publishes the proof transcript a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn and r1, ..., rn.
The verifier, V , conducts the following steps using the same hash function H
and the proof transcript a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn and r1, ..., rn:
• V computes c = H(a1 + a2 + a3 + b1 + b2 + b3) = 10.












9 ∗ 87 ∗ 133 =
6 ∗ 12 ∗ 12 = 13 and vc
∏n
i=1 ai = 4
10 ∗ 16 ∗ 12 ∗ 18 = 13 and checks they are
equal.












9 ∗37 ∗83 =
13∗2∗6 = 18 and wc
∏n
i=1 bi = 16
10 ∗3∗2∗2 = 18 and checks they are equal.
3.2.5 Publicly Verifiable Shuffle of Encrypted Values
Several methods have been suggested for verifying a shuffle of El-Gamal en-
crypted values. These include methods by Groth [23], Neff [37], and Furukawa
and Sako [17]. This project uses the Furukawa and Sako [17] algorithm.
Both the Groth [23] and Neff [37] algorithms are based on the principle that
a polynomial remains the same under a permutation of it’s roots. Using this
principle, they are able to prove that a correct shuffle has been done without
revealing what that shuffle is.
The Furukawa and Sako [17] algorithm is an interactive verification algorithm
that uses a permutation matrix to prove in zero knowledge that the shuffle was
done correctly without revealing the actual permutation used. A permutation of
shuffled values involves a set of initial encrypted values (A,B), a set of shuffled
and randomised values (AShuffled,BShuffled), and a permutation pi. This per-
mutation can then be represented as a matrixMij where i, j = 1, ..., n. The proof
of the shuffle then involves proving:
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1 mod q if i = j
0 mod q if i 6= j














1 mod q if i = j = k
0 mod q otherwise
• Proof 3: The integers r1, ..., rn and the matrixMij used in Proof 1 and Proof
2 are the same.
• Proof 4: For each pair (AShuffledi, BShuffledi) the same integers r1, ..., rn
and matrixMij have been used.
Proof 1 and Proof 2 are proved using a series of products. Proof 3 is proved by
applying the same integers and matrix to an independent set of randomly chosen
basis that will need to be chosen at the commencement of the auction and known
to the auctioneer. Proof 4 is proved using the proof of equality of two logarithm











j . The completeness, soundness, and zero knowledge
of this proof are presented in the appendix A.5. This zero knowledge proof of a
correct shuffle of encrypted values is used in the public verification protocol in
Section 6.4.
3.3 Other Verification Techniques
3.3.1 Cut and Choose Verification
The Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner garbled circuit auction scheme uses a cut and
choose verification of the garbled circuit sent by the auction issuer to the auction-
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eer [36]. This involves the auction issuer sending n > 1 copies of the garbled
circuit to the auctioneer who opens n − 1 of the garbled circuits, asks the auc-
tion issuer to remove the garbling, and then verifies that the circuit does in fact
compute the correct auction result. In this scenario the probability of an incorrect
circuit being detected is (n− 1)/n.
A similar technique to this could possibly be used to verify a set of auction-
eers. Say the bidders decide on a certain index, say n < m, and they run the
auction m times with only the n-th run being the ’official’ auction. Then the bid-
ders could reveal their bid values for the m-1 auction runs that were not ’official’
and verify that the auctioneers are correctly computing the auction result. Unfor-
tunately, this scheme relies on none of the bidders colluding with the auctioneers
and telling them which auction is the ’official’ run.
A drawback of this verification process is that it can be quite expensive, using
garbled circuits it will involve sending multiple garbled circuits to the auctioneer,
with every garbled circuit potentially being quite large [36](the actual sizes of the
circuits used to conduct combinatorial auctions are presented in Section 8.6).
3.3.2 Verifiable Secret Sharing
Verifiable secret sharing was first developed to allow entities receiving shares of
a secret to verify that the dealer had given them a correct share of the secret, and
to allow the verification that shares being used in the reconstruction of the secret
were also correct.
Kikuchi makes use of verifiable secret sharing to allow bidders to verify auc-
tioneers, as well as to allow auctioneers to verify the bidders [31]. The auctioneer
can verify that the share of a bid they have been sent by a bidder is correct. The
auctioneer then publishes the sum of all the shares of bids, and the bidders can
verify that the auctioneer has correctly computed the sum of the shares.
Publicly verifiable secret sharing allows anyone to verify the shares of a secret.
The main advantage of publicly verifiable secret sharing is that verification is not
restricted to dealers or secret share holders, but can be carried out by any third
party [46].
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3.3.3 Range Proofs
Lipmaa has developed a large amount of work on range proofs and their applica-
tions to auctions and e-voting [33]. Lipmaa then extended this work and used it
to create a secure sealed bid auction scheme [34]. The auction scheme represents
bids using homomorphic encryption and range proofs are used to first prove that
the bid is constructed correctly, that is bid = Bi where i <= V + 1. V is set to the
maximum possible bid.
This range proof is then extended to provide a method to allow one of the
parties in the two party trust model to verify the result of the auction is cor-
rect. Given a coin-extractable doubly homomorphic encryption scheme (like the
Damgard-Jurik cryptosystem) you can prove that a value X is the second largest
amount from a set of encrypted values [34].
3.4 The Homomorphic Auction Protocol
This section presents a brief overview of the auction protocol by Suzuki and
Yokoo [53] which is used as the homomorphic auction protocol in this thesis. This
protocol is capable of computing the outcome of single good or combinatorial
auctions while keeping losing bid values secret. The outcome can be computed
by either a single auctioneer or a group of auctioneers using threshold encryption
techniques. In this thesis the threshold version of the auction scheme is used ex-
clusively. This is because the threshold scheme provides greater protection of the
privacy of losing bid values by spreading the trust over a group of auctioneers
rather than a single auctioneer. If a single auctioneer is used, it would be possible
for that auctioneer to decrypt all the bid values if it was malicious. When using
a threshold scheme, at least t parties in a (t, n) secret sharing scheme must be
malicious to be able to decrypt losing bid values.
3.4.1 El-Gamal Encryption System
The homomorphic auction protocol makes use of the El-Gamal asymmetric ho-
momorphic encryption system [18] to encrypt bids. Asymmetric encryption uses
a public key for encryption and a private key for decryption. Any party can en-
crypt a message using the public key of the recipient but only the recipient who
knows the private key can decrypt the message. Homomorphic encryption is a
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form of encryption where an algebraic operation can be performed on the plain-
text of an encrypted item by performing an algebraic operation on the cipher-text.
In the El-Gamal encryption scheme performing a multiplication of cipher-texts
performs a multiplication of the underlying plain-texts.
The El-Gamal encryption scheme uses two large primes number p and qwhere
q|p − 1, the cyclic group of integers Zp closed under multiplication, and a gener-
ator of the group g as public values known to all parties. A secret key x for a
participant is chosen randomly from the range 0, ..., q − 1 and the public key is
calculated as y = gx. An El-Gamal encryption involves choosing a random value
r and calculating the encryption of a value m as E(m) = (gr, yrm) = (A,B). The
decryption of E(m) is computed by calculating D(E(m)) = B/Ax = yrm/grx =
grxm/grx = m.
An example of El-Gamal encryption is now given where p = 23, q = 11, g = 2,
and x = 4 and all operations are done on the group Z23. All operations are done
modulo p unless otherwise stated. The public key is calculated by computing y =
gx = 24 = 16. Suppose the messagem = 6 is being encrypted using random value
r = 7. The encryption is calculated E(m) = (gr, yrm) = (27, 167 ∗ 6) = (13, 16). To
decrypt this, calculate B/Ax = 16/134 = 16/18 = 16 ∗ 9 = 6. Division is done by
multiplying the dividend by the multiplicative inverse of the divisor. In this case
the multiplicative inverse of 18 mod 23 = 9.
Using El-Gamal encryption a new randomised ciphertext can be created by
multiplying the original ciphertext by an encryption of 1. If the decisional Diffie-
Hellman (DDH) problem is infeasible, one cannot determine whether a cipher-
text is a randomised ciphertext of the original or not. Using the values from the
above example, suppose there is an El-Gamal encrypted value ofM = 6, E(M) =
(13, 16). Now 1 can be encrypted using the random value r = 3 and the same keys
as above by computing E(1) = (gr, yrM) = (23, 163 ∗ 1) = (8, 2). If E(M) multi-
plied byE(1) it gives Product = (13, 16)∗(8, 2) = (12, 9). The value Product can be
decrypted by calculatingD(Product) = B/Ax = 9/124 = 9/13 = 9∗−7 = 6. E(M)
and Product look like totally different cipher-texts and it is not known whether
the original plain-texts are the same without decrypting them. This randomi-
sation technique is used in the shift and randomise step of the auction protocol
described in Section 3.4.5.
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3.4.2 Auction Graphs
Combinatorial auctions can be represented by auction graphs where nodes rep-
resent goods, edges between nodes represent the allocation of a subset of goods,














































































Figure 3.2: Example Auction Graph
Figure 3.2 provides an example auction graph for three goodsG1,G2,G3with
two bidders. Each edge is labelled for the subset of goods it represents along
with the bids of the two bidders for that allocation. A complete path through
the graph is an allocation of goods and the auctioneer needs to find the optimal
path through the graph to compute the auction. An optimal path is a complete
path where there are no other paths that provide greater value. The optimal path
is shown in this graph as the thinner red line. The optimal allocation for this
auction is to allocate G3 to bidder 2 for $7 and G1, G2 to bidder 1 for $16 for
a total of $23. There may be more than one optimal path in a graph, but there
should be no other paths that have a greater value.
3.4.3 Bid Vectors
Bids in the homomorphic auction protocol are represented by encrypted bid vec-
tors. The bid vectors are composed of a series of encryptions of a publicly known
value Z followed by encryptions of 1. The value of the bid vector is indicated by
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the number of Z values encrypted. For example, a bid of value 3 and length 6 is
represented by the bid vector E(Z), E(Z), E(Z), E(1), E(1), E(1) and a bid vector
of value 2 and length 5 is E(Z), E(Z), E(1), E(1), E(1). The bid vectors length
must be at least as long as the maximum bid value for a complete allocation.
3.4.4 Finding the Maximum bid for a Node
To find the maximum bid value for a node while keeping losing bid values secret
the auctioneers compute the product of all the bids for on the incoming edges for
a node on the auction graph. This product is then decrypted item-wise from right













Figure 3.3: Finding the Maximum Bid for a Link
Figure 3.3 illustrates this process for the auctioneer group at Node 2 to find the
maximum bid for the node. The auctioneers first compute the item-wise product
of all the bid vectors on the incoming links. This can be done by any auctioneer
due to the homomorphic nature of the encryption. The auctioneers then publish
their shares of the decryption of the item on the far right of the product vector and
use Lagrange interpolation to decrypt once t (from the (t, n) threshold encryption
scheme) shares of the decryption have been published. They will then repeat this
decryption from right to left until they find an item in the product vector that
does not equal 1. In this example, the item in the fourth place of the product
vector will decrypt to Z and so the auctioneers know that the maximum bid for
this node is 4 and learn nothing about the values of the losing bids.
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3.4.5 Shift and Randomise
Once the auctioneers have found the maximum bid m for the node, they shift
and randomise any bid vectors on the outgoing links of the auction graph to
add the maximum bid value to these bid vectors. The auctioneers first shift the
bid vectors on the outgoing links right by m places and add m encryptions of
Z which adds the value of m to the bids vectors. The auctioneers then create a
bid vector composed entirely of encryptions of 1 and multiply the shifted vector
by this randomising vector. Multiplying the items in the shifted bid vectors by
encryptions of 1 randomises the vector so the value of m remains hidden and
prevents other parties from counting the new items in the shifted vectors. Due
to the homomorphic nature of the encryption, multiplying by encryptions of 1
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Figure 3.4: Shifting and Randomising a Bid Vector
Figure 3.4 illustrates the process of shifting and randomising a bid vector. The
auctioneers in groupA2 have already computed the maximum bid for node 2 and
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now shift and randomise the bid on link 2 by the value m = 2. The auctioneers
first shift the original bid vector right by 2 places and add 2 encryptions of Z.
They then multiply the shifted bid vector by a vector of encryptions of 1 and
publish it on link 2.
3.4.6 An Example
To calculate the result of an auction the auctioneers use the techniques in the ear-
lier sections to find the optimal path for the auction graph. They then back track































































Figure 3.5: A Simple Example Auction
Figure 3.5 shows an example auction graph with encrypted bid vectors pub-
lished to the links of the graph. To compute the result of the auction the auction-
eers will complete the following actions:
• The auctioneers in group A2 find the maximum bid for node 2 by multiply-
ing the bids on the incoming links together and decrypting them from right
to left until the first item is found that does not decrypt to 1. The optimal
value for this node optimal2 = 1.
• The auctioneers in group A2 shift and randomise the bid vectors for link 2































































Figure 3.6: After Shifting the Bids for Link 2
• Figure 3.6 shows the auction graph once the auctioneers in group A2 have
shifted the bid vectors for link 2 by the value optimal2 = 1.
• The auctioneers in groupA3 nowmultiply the the bid vectors on the incom-
ing links 2 and 3 together to form a product bid vector. The auctioneers in
group A3 decrypt the items in the product bid vector from right to left until
the first item that does not decrypt to 1 is found to find the optimal value
for this node optimal3 = 4. As this is the final node in the auction graph this
is the optimal value for the auction.
• The auctioneers in group A3 now trace back the optimal value to find the
winning bids. This is done by decrypting the bid vectors on the incom-
ing links at the index optimal3 to find the bid that decrypts to Z at this in-
dex. In this case the bid from bidder 1 on link 3 decrypts to Z at the index
optimal3 = 4. This means that the winning bid for the auction is bidder 1 on
link 3 for goods 1 and 2 together.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has presented background work that is used in the rest of this thesis.
It began by presenting the concepts of zero knowledge proofs and non-interactive
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zero knowledge proofs that are used to construct the group verification protocol
in Chapter 5 and the public verification protocol in Chapter 6. A number of well
known zero knowledge proofs have been presented. The zero knowledge proof
of equality of discrete logarithms presented in Section 3.2.2 is used to conduct
verifiable threshold El-Gamal decryption in Section 5.3.1 and to prove the bid
vectors are valid in Section 5.4 and in Section 6.3. The zero knowledge proof an
encrypted item decrypts to 1 or Z in Section 3.2.3 is used to prove the bid vectors
are valid in Section 5.4 and in Section 6.3. The public verification protocol uses the
zero knowledge proof of a correct shuffle of encrypted values from Section 3.2.5
to prove that a bid vector from a set encrypted bid vectors is the maximum bid in
Section 6.4.
The rest of this chapter has detailed the homomorphic auction protocol by
Suzuki and Yokoo [53]. The individual constructions and steps of the auction
protocol are explained before presenting a complete example auction. This is
important backgroundwork for this thesis as both the group verification protocol
and the public verification protocol add verification to the homomorphic auction
protocol and so an understanding of the auction protocol is necessary to construct
and understand the verification protocols.
Chapter 4
Extending Garbled Circuits
Garbled circuits are a verifiable privacy preserving auction protocol first sug-
gested by Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner [36]. They make use of the cryptographic
technique of garbled circuits introduced by Yao [52]. Garbled circuits use a two
party trust model with an Auction Issuer and an Auctioneer. As long as these
two parties do not collude the auction is privacy preserving.
A contribution of this thesis is the construction of a novel circuit that can com-
pute combinatorial auctions taking as inputs the number of bidders, the maxi-
mum price, and the number of goods. In previously published work, garbled
circuits had only been used to compute (M+1)st price auctions. A circuit is a net-
work of Boolean gates with a set of inputs, a set of intermediate gates, and a set of
outputs gates. When the parameters of the function are presented bit wise to the
input gates, the intermediate gates are used to compute the values of the output
gates which are the result of the function the circuit is computing.
Figure 4.1 shows a circuit that is being used for a trivial auction with one
good, two bidders and two bits representing the price. The input of the circuit is
the bids for the two bidders represented by two bits. The outputs are two Boolean
values that indicate whether bidder one or bidder two was the winner and two
Boolean values that indicate the maximum or winning price. The example in
Figure 4.1 shows bidder two winning the auction with a maximum price of 11
which is three. To further illustrate consider another example. Bidder one bids
two so has input 10 and bidder two bids one and so has input 01. In this case, the
output is Bidder 1 Winner = 1, Bidder 2 Winner = 0, Maximum Price Bit 1 = 1, and
Maximum Price Bit 2 = 0.
39



































Figure 4.1: A Simple Auction Circuit
4.1 Garbled Circuit Auction Protocol
Figure 4.2 shows the parties involved in the garbled circuits auction protocol. The
protocol preserves the communication pattern of non-electronic auctions so the
bidders and the client only need to have a connection to the auctioneer, and the
auctioneer is the only party that needs a connection to the auction issuer.
Client Auctioneer /Circuit Executor
Auction Issuer /




Figure 4.2: Garbled Circuit Parties
The basic steps of an auction using the garbled circuit protocol are:
• The client contacts the auctioneer with details of the auction they wish to
run.
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• The auctioneer advertises details of the auction including the number of
goods, number of prices, and the auction issuer being used.
• The auction issuer constructs a garbled circuit for the auction based on how
many bidders, goods, and the number of bits in the price as well as a map-
ping from the garbled outputs of the garbled circuit to the actual outputs of
the auction and sends them to the auctioneer.
• The auction issuer, auctioneer, and bidders use a protocol called verifiable
proxy oblivious transfer (VPOT) [28] which results in the auctioneer learn-
ing the garbled values of the inputs, and the auction issuer and bidders
learning no new information.
• The auctioneer executes the garbled circuit using the garbled input and de-
codes the output using the output mapping sent by the auction issuer.
4.2 Algorithms
4.2.1 Table of Definitions
The following terms are used in the description of garbled circuits:
• Client: The entity that requests the auctioneer to conduct an auction.
• Auctioneer: Takes the details from the client and runs the auction. Commu-
nicates with the auction issuer to get the garbled circuit and garbled input
values.
• Auction Issuer: Assists in running the auction. Should be from a separate
organisation than the auctioneer. Garbles circuits and then assists the auc-
tioneer in learning the garbled inputs.
• Bidder: Bids on items in the auctions.
• Auction Circuit: Circuit composed of Boolean gates that can be used to com-
pute the result of an auction.
• Node: Boolean gate in an auction circuit.
• Wire: Link between two nodes of an auction circuit. Awire can have a value
b of 0 or 1.
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• W 0 andW 1: Multi-bit random values that are used to represent the 1 and 0
value of a wire.
• c: Result of a random permutation pi of a wires value b.
• < W b, c >: Garbled value of a wire. Formed by concatenating W b for the
value b of the wire with the result of the permutation of the value b, c.
• g: The node function which calculates the output of the node based on the
inputs. For example, for an AND gate g(0, 1) = 0 and g(1, 1) = 1.
• Gate Table: Each node in the auction circuit has a gate table that maps the
garbled inputs to a garbled output.
• Output Mapping: Table that maps the garbled outputs to actual outputs.
Each output wire has an output mapping.
• Pseudo Random Function F (a, b): Pseudo random function F takes a as a
seed and b as an argument and returns a random value. The SHA-1 hash
function is used to represent this function.
4.2.2 Garbled Circuit Generation
To garble a circuit, the auction issuer executes the following algorithm on the
nodes and wires of the auction circuit.
Algorithm GarbleCircuit
Input: AuctionCircuit AC, RandomFunction F
Output: GateTable GT, OutputMapping OM
1. (∗ Assign random values to the wires ∗)
2. for ∀wire i ∈ AC
3. Randomly generateW 0i andW
1
i corresponding to 0 and 1.
4. Choose a random permutation over {0,1}, pii : bi → ci.
5. (∗ Construct function tables for every node ∗)
6. for ∀ node k ∈ AC with input nodes i,j
7. for ci ← 0 to 1
8. for cj ← 0 to 1
9. GT (k)(ci, cj)←
10. GetGTV alue(i, j, k)
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11. (∗ Construct output mapping ∗)
12. for ∀ output wire k ∈ AC
13. OM(k, 0)←< W 0k , pik(0) >
14. OM(k, 1)←< W 1k , pik(1) >
Algorithm GarbleCircuit garbles an auction circuit. The first step is to assign
random values to every wire of the auction circuit. Every wire has a random
value corresponding to 0 and 1 (W 0,W 1) assigned to it as well as a random per-
mutation of its output pi : b → c that permutes the wires value b to c. Figure 4.3
shows the random valuesW 0 andW 1 assigned to a wire as well the permutation
from b→ c. It shows the garbled values at the bottom of the image, showing how




















Figure 4.3: Garbling a Wire
For every node in the auction circuit a table is constructed that, given the gar-
bled input of the node, outputs the garbled output of a node. If the node is an
output node, an output mapping is also producedmapping the garbled output of
the node to the actual output. These steps can only be performed with the knowl-
edge of the random values assigned to all the wires. The algorithm GetGTValue
details the calculation done for an entry in the gate table. The tables for each node
and the output mappings are then sent to the auctioneer to execute the circuit.
Algorithm GetGTValue
Input: InputNode i, InputNode j, OutputNode k




k , ck)⊕ (F (W
bi
i , cj))⊕ (F (W
bj
j , ci))}
44 CHAPTER 4. EXTENDING GARBLED CIRCUITS
4.2.3 Executing a Circuit
The following algorithm is executed by the auctioneer after it has received the
GateTable and OutputMapping arrays from the auction issuer. The auctioneer
will also have received the garbled inputs after completing the VPOT protocol
with the bidders and auction issuer.
Algorithm ExecuteCircuit
Input: AuctionCircuit AC, GateTables GT, OutputMapping OM, GarbledInputs
GI, RandomFunction F
Output: ActualValues AV
1. (∗ Reset All Nodes ∗)
2. for ∀ Nodes k ∈ AC
3. Computed(k)← false
4. (∗ Compute All Nodes ∗)
5. repeat
6. for Node k with input nodes i and j
7. if ((Computed(i) ∩ Computed(j)) ∪ i, j ∈ GI)
8. GarbledOutputk ←
9. GetGO(i, j, k,GT )
10. Computed(k)← true
11. until All Nodes have been Computed
(∗ Convert Garbled Output to Actual Output ∗)
12. for ∀ output nodes o
13. if (GarbledOutputo = OM(o, 1))
14. then AV (o)← 1
15. else AV (o)← 0
Algorithm ExecuteCircuit executes a garbled circuit given the auction circuit,
gate tables, output mapping, garbled inputs, and random function. It loops
through all the nodes in the auction circuit until they have all been computed.
The gate tables are used to compute the garbled output of a node k with input
wires i and j. Inputs i and j will have garbled input values of < W bii , ci > and
< W
bj
j , cj >. From the garbled inputs the values ci, cj , W
bi
i , and W
bj
j can be ex-
tracted from the concatenated garbled inputs. Then the garbled output can be
computed using algorithm GetGO. Algorithm GetGO uses the entry in the gate




input cj and with seedW
bj
j and input ci. The output mapping is used to convert
the garbled output to the actual output for an output node.
Algorithm GetGO
Input: InputNode i, InputNode j, Node k, GateTables GT
Output: bit [] GarbledOutput
1. GarbledOutput←
2. F (W bii , cj)⊕ F (W
bj
j , ci)⊕GT [k](ci, cj)
4.2.4 Worked Example
Figure 4.4 illustrates a trivial garbled circuit with an AND and an OR gate. Both
the AND and the OR gate have one bit inputs and outputs. This circuit has three
inputs and one output.
The auction issuer has executed the GarbleCircuit algorithm to produce the
’Random Values and Permutation Assigned to Wires’ table shown in Figure 4.4
that contains the random values assigned to each wire in the example as well as
the permutation. These random values are kept private by the auction issuer and
not revealed either to the auctioneer or to the bidders. The auction issuer also
produces the ’Gatetables’ and the ’Garbled Output to Output Mapping’ shown
in Figure 4.4 using the GarbleCircuit algorithm. The garbled value of a wire is set
to < W b, c > so for wire Z the garbled value of 0 is < 01, 0 >= 010 as shown
in Figure 4.3. The ’Random Function F’ shown in Figure 4.4 is a public function
available to both the auctioneer and the auction issuer.
To execute the circuit in 4.4 the auctioneer would take the following steps:
• Find out the garbled input values. In this example we will set Input 1=1,
Input 2=1, and Input 3=0. Given these example inputs, the output of the
circuit should be 1. The garbled input value for V is 001, for W is 010, and
for Y is 010. The garbled input value is the garbled value of the wire for
the input value of the wire. So as Input 1 = 1, the garbled value for V is
< W 1, c1 >= 001.
• Now the gates are executed. To execute the AND gate the garbled inputs
and the gatetable are used. The output is 001⊕ 111⊕ 100 = 010.
• Now the OR gate is executed. The output is 101 ⊕ 001 ⊕ 001 = 101. Using
the garbled output to output mapping, the output of the garbled circuit is 1.
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Figure 4.4: Garbled Circuit Example
This is a small example that shows how a garbled circuit works. A circuit that
executes an auction has thousands of gates depending on the parameters of the
circuit.
4.3 Extending Garbled Circuits
Themain contribution of this thesis to improving the garbled circuits auction pro-
tocol is an algorithm for the construction of an auction circuit that can compute
the result of a combinatorial auction. While this is not a modification to the pro-
tocol itself, it is a construction that allows us to conduct combinatorial auctions
using the garbled circuits protocol. Previously published work has used garbled
circuits to conduct single good auctions only.
Auction circuits for the garbled circuit auction protocol need to be constructed
dynamically based on the number of bidders, the maximum price, and the num-
ber of goods for the auction. A circuit for computing the result of an auction with
ten bidders will havemore gates than a circuit for conducting an auctionwith five
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bidders. An algorithm is needed that can return a combinatorial auction circuit
for computing the result of an auction taking as inputs the number of bidders,
the maximum price, and the number of goods.
The design and implementation of the combinatorial auction circuit began
by looking at implementations of single good auction circuits. Kurosawa and
Ogata [32] have constructed an algorithm for constructing auction circuits that
compute first or second price single good auctions efficiently. These auction cir-
cuits take the bids from every bidder as input and output the winning bidder and
the winning price for the auction. The auction circuit constructed is composed of
NOT, AND, OR, XOR, and SELECT nodes. A SELECT gate has three inputs, if
the first input is true it outputs the second input, and if the first input is false it
outputs the third input. A SELECT gate is not a true Boolean gate, but it can be
implemented using AND and OR gates and makes construction of circuits eas-
ier. The first price auction circuit is used as a building block for constructing the
combinatorial circuit.
A basic add circuit was also constructed that given two bit-wise values as
input, outputs the sum of these two values. This circuit was based on the Boolean
gates used in a digital adder circuit for addition of binary values [30].
4.3.1 The Combinatorial Auction Circuit
To develop an algorithm to dynamically construct an auction circuit based on
the number of bidders, goods, and the maximum price, the first step is to show
how an auction circuit might be constructed that could compute the outcome of a
combinatorial auction. Using the single good auction circuit and the add circuit,
the actions in the homomorphic auction protocol can be computed. The single
good circuit computes the maximum bid for a set of bids and the add circuit can
be used to conduct the shift and randomise operation to add the maximum bid
for a node to the bids on the outgoing links for that node.
The homomorphic auction protocol uses an auction graph to represent combi-
natorial auctions as shown in Figure 4.5 and described in Section 3.4.2. Using the
auction graph and the circuits for computing the maximum bid for an auction
and for adding two values together an auction circuit to compute the optimal
value for a combinatorial auction was designed and implemented.
For every node in the auction graph the single good auction circuit is used
to compute the maximum bid for the bids on the incoming links. Then the add
























Figure 4.5: A Three Good Auction Graph
circuit is used to add this maximum value to all the bids on the outgoing link.
Figure 4.6 shows the auction graph from Figure 4.5 with auction circuits in place
to construct our combinatorial auction circuit. Every link has a maximum bid
circuit attached to it that outputs the maximum bid for that link. Every node
except the last node in the graph has an adder circuit that adds the maximum
bid for the incoming link to the bids on the outgoing link. The last node has a
final maximum bid circuit that outputs the optimal value for the combinatorial
auction.
A combinatorial auction circuit has now been developed that can output the
optimal value for the auction graph, but it also needs to output what bidders
won what goods and the price for each bidder. Every maximum bid circuit can
output not only the maximum bid for that link but also the maximum bidder.
At every link in the graph the maximum bid circuit outputs what bidder won the
subset of goods represented by this link andwhat price they bid. These values are
combined for every link in a path by OR’ing together the outputs of every link.
The outputs of every path are AND’ed with the output of the final maximum bid
circuit and OR’ed together over all the paths. Every winning bidder and price not
on the optimal path is reset by AND’ing it with the output of the final maximum
bid circuit which outputs 0 for every path except the optimal one.























































Figure 4.6: Circuits on an Auction Graph
4.3.2 The Combinatorial Auction Circuit Creation Algorithm
Now the design of an auction circuit to compute the outcome of combinatorial
auctions was complete, the next step was to write an algorithm that outputs
a combinatorial auction circuit based on the number of bidders, the maximum
price, and the number of goods. Based on the input parameters, the algorithm
first constructs an auction graph that represents the auction. Figure 4.5 shows
an example auction graph for 3 goods. The algorithm then constructs the auc-
tion circuit by iterating through the auction graph and constructing sub-circuits
of maximum bid circuits for every link in the auction graph and add circuits for
every node. The inputs and outputs of these sub-circuits are connected in such a
way that the circuit computes the result of the combinatorial auction as described
in the previous section. This algorithm has been implemented in Java and the
circuit created as a Java object. Using this algorithm the garbled circuits auction
protocol can be used to conduct combinatorial auctions, something that was not
possible based on the original garbled circuits paper.
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4.4 Verification
Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner suggest several verification techniques to cover some
of the potential problems with this protocol [36]. The problems addressed by the
verification process are:
• A malicious auction issuer sending a garbled circuit to the auctioneer that
does not correctly compute the result of the auction and could declare an
arbitrary bidder as the winner. If the auction issuer sends x different copies
of the garbled circuit to the auctioneer who, with the help of the auction is-
suer, opens and checks x-1 of the circuits to make sure they correctly execute
the auction, then an auction issuer who is sending corrupt circuits could be
found with probability (x− 1)/x.
• A malicious auction issuer can change bids when using the original proxy
oblivious transfer (POT) protocol of the original garbled circuit auction pro-
tocol. This is addresses by using the verifiable proxy oblivious transfer
(VPOT) protocol that was suggested by Juels and Szydlo [28].
• A malicious bidder could submit an invalid bid. An invalid bid would be
found by the VPOT protocol and could be replaced with a place sitting bid
of 0 without restarting the auction.
• Amalicious auctioneer could alter the bid values as they come through from
the bidders before they forward them on to the auction issuer. If the auction
issuer publishes a hash of all the bid values it receives via the auctioneer,
bidders can check if the correct hash values for their bids are present.
• The auctioneer could execute another circuit rather than the one sent by
the auction issuer. This can be detected if the auction issuer publishes a
signed translation table that provides the possible outputs of the circuit put
through a one way function. The bidders or auctioneer can then check that
the outputs the auctioneer lists put through the same one way function are
present in the translation table.
These techniques can be used to provide a group verification process for the
garbled circuits auction protocol as long as the auctioneer and auction issuer do
not collude.
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4.5 Security Analysis
Garbled circuits are privacy preserving as long as the auction issuer and auction-
eer do not collude. It is secure against a passive adversary when the adversary
is either a bidder, auctioneer, or the auction issuer. The protocol can be extended
to detect active adversaries who are not keeping to the correct protocol using the
verification techniques in the previous section.
In a secure garbled auction, the auctioneer should not be able to work out the
intermediate values of the circuit. The random permutation of wire i, pii : bi → ci,
prevents the auctioneer from learning these intermediate values as it will know
the ci value but has no way of knowing what bi value it maps to.
If the auctioneer knows the garbled inputs and output of a node, it cannot
find out the other garbled output of the node. The random function F masks the
other values and makes them appear random.
If the number of outputs of a node is greater than 1 a different input to the
random function must be used for each output. If an identifier I is assigned
to each node then FW (c, I) can be used for masking instead of FW (c) [36]. This
results in a separate gate table for every output node.
Auction Issuer Auctioneer Bidder
Knows: Knows: Knows:
Learns:





Bid Value (1 or 0)
Garbled Input Value of Bid
Figure 4.7: VPOT protocol
The auctioneer should also be prevented from learning the actual input val-
ues of the bidders.The verifiable proxy oblivious transfer protocol (VPOT) [29] is
a multi party protocol involving the bidder, auctioneer, and auction issuer and is
illustrated in Figure 4.7. The auction issuer knows the garbled value of the input
wires, the bidders knows the actual input, and the auctioneer learns the garbled
value of the input only. The VPOT protocol prevents the auctioneer or auction
issuer from learning the actual inputs of the bidder, as well as providing veri-
fication that the bidder, auctioneer, and auction issuer carried out the protocol
correctly.
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4.6 Summary
This chapter has introduced garbled circuits and the garbled circuit auction pro-
tocol by Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner [36]. The construction of a Boolean circuit
to compute the result of combinatorial auctions has then been detailed. Using
the combinatorial auction circuit developed in this chapter, the garbled circuit
auction protocol is able to compute the result of combinatorial auctions where




The garbled circuits auction protocol of the previous chapter uses two party trust.
Greater robustness can be achieved by using a threshold trust model where a
group of auctioneers conducts the auction protocol and the protocol can still
complete if one of the auctioneers fails or is malicious. the homomorphic auc-
tion protocol by Suzuki and Yokoo [53] is a threshold trust auction protocol that
can conduct combinatorial auctions and keep losing bid values secret but is not
verifiable. Verification of the homomorphic auction protocol provides auction
participants with greater confidence in the result of the auction. The first itera-
tion of our verification protocol for the homomorphic auction protocol is a group
verification protocol. A group verification protocol can only be verified by par-
ticipants taking part in the protocol. In this case, the auctioneers all provide zero
knowledge proofs of the actions they take to execute the auction protocol and
they can verify the actions taken by other auctioneers. If an auctioneer detected
one of the other auctioneers deviating from the correct behaviour for the auction
protocol, they could publish information on the deviating auctioneer publicly.
A malicious auctioneer could claim that a correct auctioneer has behaved in-
correctly when it has not. To prevent this, at least a quorum of auctioneers is
required to claim that an auctioneer has deviated from the auction protocol. This
quorum value is the same value used in the threshold encryption. This means
that unless at least a quorum of auctioneers are malicious, losing bid values are
kept secret and bidders can have confidence that the auction protocol executed
correctly unless indicated otherwise by the auctioneers. In the case of quorum
auctioneers indicating that one of the actions taken by one of the auctioneers has
failed the verification, the auction protocol can either continue ignoring any val-
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ues returned by the offending auctioneer, or the auction result can be invalidated
and the auction started again.
5.1 Threat Model
The provers and verifiers in our verification protocol are assumed to be polynomially-
bounded active adversaries that may try and prove incorrect assertions. For ex-
ample, an active adversarial prover may try and convince an honest verifier that
they have correctly computed an incorrect auction result. It is assumed that any
number of polynomially-bounded active adversaries may be colluding together
to disrupt the verification protocol as long as there are less than the quorum or
threshold value t used in the (t, n) threshold scheme. Different parties may col-
lude, so a bidder and an auctioneer may collude together.
It is assumed that any party can get a copy of any public message sent between
the auction participants and use it to try and break the verification protocol. The
verification protocol does not address the case where a malicious party controls
the communication channel and prevents messages from reaching a particular
participant effectively performing a denial of service attack on that party, alters
the messages in transit, or replays messages. Alteredmessages will likely fail ver-
ification and could be used to reduce the confidence in an honest prover, however
schemes such as digital signatures of messages can be used to prevent this kind
of attack but are outside the scope of this thesis.
5.2 Security Goals
The security goals for the verification protocol are now reviewed in the context
of a group verification protocol for the homomorphic auction protocol.
1. Auctioneers should be able to verify the actions of the other participants
in the auction protocol giving a high confidence that they have correctly
executed the steps in the auction protocol.
2. Verification of the auction protocol should reveal no information other than
what is revealed by the auction protocol.
3. It should be computationally infeasible for a bidder to submit an invalid bid
that passes the verification checks.
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4. It should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to not count all
the bids and pass the verification checks. For the homomorphic auction
protocol, it should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to not
count a bid when calculating the maximum bid for a node and to pass the
verification checks.
5. It should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to announce an
incorrect winning bidder(s) or price(s) and pass the verification checks. For
the homomorphic auction protocol, it should be computationally infeasi-
ble for an auctioneer to do an incorrect shift and randomise, or incorrectly
compute the optimal path once the optimal value is found and to pass the
verification checks.
5.3 Threshold El-Gamal Decryption
Threshold El-Gamal encryption is used in the homomorphic auction protocol so
that a single auctioneer cannot decrypt all the losing bids for a link in the auc-
tion graph. The El-Gamal secret key is shared among a group of nmembers x→
(x1, ..., xn) using Shamirs secret sharing scheme [47]. Encryption still involves us-
ing a public key y = gx and a random value r to calculate (A,B) = (gr, yrM). To
perform a threshold decryption of a value when using a (t, n) threshold encryp-
tion scheme requires a group I of participants with at least t members. Every
participant in I knows the indexes i of the other members in the group. In a (3, 5)
sharing scheme the group I could be made of parties with indexes 2, 3, and 5.
Every member of I then follows the following steps to calculate Ax used in the
decryption wherem = B/Ax:
• Every member i calculates and publishes among the group zi = A
xi .
• All members compute on their own the λ-coefficients of the Lagrange inter-
polation of the indexes i in the group I .









i∈I λixi = Ax
using Lagrange interpolation to calculate x =
∑
i∈I λixi.
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• The decryption can then be completed by all the members on their own
calculatingM = B/Ax as in standard El-Gamal decryption.
When every member of the group I correctly follows the protocol the decryp-
tion will succeed and correctly decrypt the cipher-text.
5.3.1 Verifiable Threshold El-Gamal Decryption
When using threshold El-Gamal decryption, if one of the members of the group
publishes an incorrect zi value the correct plain-text will not be decrypted. If the
individual public keys of the secret keys (y1 = g
x1 , y2 = g
x2 , ..., yn = g
xn) can
be published with the group public key y, the members in the group doing the
decryption I can publish zero knowledge proofs that they correctly computed
the zi values. Every member iwill publish a zero knowledge proof of equality of
logarithms from section 3.2.2 by publishing a proof that they know the value xi
such that yi = g
xi and zi = A
xi .
By publishing a zero knowledge proof that the zi value is correctly computed,
a malicious participant publishing incorrect zi values will be detected with a high
probability and can be removed from the group. As long as less than t partici-
pants of the secret sharing scheme are malicious, the decryption can be carried
out correctly even in the presence of malicious participants.
5.3.2 Completeness
Each participant in the group doing the decryption has to publish a proof of
equality of discrete logarithms. As the proof of equality of logarithms is shown to
be complete in Section A.2.1, the verifiable threshold El-Gamal decryption must
also be complete. To put it another way, suppose the verifiable threshold decryp-
tion was not complete, then one of the proof of equality of discrete logarithms
must not be complete, but these are known to be complete.
5.3.3 Soundness
Suppose a cheating prover is trying to publish a proof that they know a value xi
where yi 6= g
xi or zi 6= A
xi . This is analogous to the situation of a cheating prover
in the proof of equality of logarithms as shown in Section A.2.2 so the soundness
is 1/q.
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5.3.4 Zero Knowledge
To check the zero knowledge property of the proofs of equality used in threshold
decryption, a simulator S can be constructed that completes the following steps
on common input p, q, g, the encrypted item (A,B), the set of participants I , the
shares z1, ..., zn, and the public keys y1, ..., yn in the random oracle model:
• For every item i in the set of participants I , S does the following:
– S outputs the transcript of the simulator for the equality of logarithms
shown in Section A.2.3 using as input p, q, g, A, yi, and zi which has
output ai, bi, ri.
The verifier then checks that for every item in the set of participants I , gri = aiy
ci
i
and Ar = biz
ci
i .
5.4 Zero Knowledge Proof of a Valid Bid Vector
A valid bid vector should be of the form:
bidvalid = E(Z), E(Z), E(Z), E(1), E(1), E(1)
All the items in the bid vector should be encryptions of 1 or the publicly known
value Z. A bid vector should also contain no gaps where an encrypted 1 is be-
tween two encrypted Z values. An invalid bid vector with a gap would be of the
form:
bidgap = E(Z), E(Z), E(1), E(Z), E(1), E(1)
To assist in the zero knowledge proof of a valid bid vector an alternate form
of the bid vector is used. Suppose every item i in the alternate bid vector alt for a
value v is calculated with the formula:
alti =
{
E(Z) if i = v
E(1) otherwise
So a bid vector of length 6 and value 3would be
E(1), E(1), E(Z), E(1), E(1), E(1).
To prove in zero knowledge that a bid vector in the alternate form is valid, we
publish proofs that every item in the bid vector is a 1 or a Z. The product of all the
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items in the bid vector is then computed and is proved to decrypt to Z. The bid
vector is then converted to standard form using a technique called integrating a
bid vector [1].
When the bidders publish their alternate form bid vectors, they also publish
a proof an encrypted item decrypts to 1 or Z from section 3.2.3 for every item in
the vector. The auctioneers can then verify that every item in the alternate form
bid vector is an encryption of 1 or Z.
The auctioneers each independently compute the product of all the items in
the bid vector. This product can be computed by any party due to the homo-
morphic nature of El-Gamal encryption. The auctioneers publish their shares of
the decryption of the product as well as zero knowledge proofs that their shares
are correctly computed as shown in Section 5.3.1. The auctioneers can then ver-
ify that the product of the items was correctly computed and, using Lagrange
interpolation, that the product of the items decrypts to Z.
Now that zero knowledge proofs that the alternate form of the bid vector is
valid have been constructed, the alternate bid vector is integrated to convert it to
the standard form of the bid vector used in the homomorphic auction protocol.
To integrate a bid vector one of the auctioneers computes the following function
on the items of the alternate bid vector alt of length l starting with the item l and
going down to item 1 to get the standard bid vector bid:
bidi =
{
alti if i = l
alti ∗ bidi−1 otherwise
This formula converts the alternate form of the bid vector to the standard form
of the bid vector and is verifiable due to the homomorphic nature of El-Gamal
encryption.
5.4.1 Completeness
There are four steps in this zero knowledge proof that need to be shown to be
complete:
• The proofs published by the bidders that every item in the alternate bid vec-
tor is an encryption of a 1 or a Z were shown to be complete in Section 3.2.3.
• Computing the product of the items is complete due to the homomorphic
nature of El-Gamal encryption. It is simply a multiplication of items in the
bid vector.
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• When computing and publishing shares of a threshold decryption the pub-
lished proofs are proofs of the equality of discrete logarithms which were
shown to be complete in Section 3.2.2.
• Converting the alternate vector into standard form is complete due to the
homomorphic nature of El-Gamal encryption.
5.4.2 Soundness
The soundness of the zero knowledge proofs used is examined in four steps:
• The proofs published by the bidders that every item in the alternate bid
vector is an encryption of a 1 or a Z are shown in Section 3.2.3 to have a
soundness of 1/q.
• Computing the product of the items in the alternate form of the bid vector
is completely sound as any party can repeat the multiplication of the items
and confirm this has been done correctly. Unless the verifier has an error in
their computation, they will always catch a cheating auctioneer in this step.
• When computing and publishing shares of a threshold decryption the proofs
published are proofs of equality of discrete logarithms which were shown
in Section 3.2.2 to have a soundness of 1/q.
• Converting the alternate vector into standard form is completely sound as
any party can repeat the multiplication of the items and confirm this has
been done correctly.
If an invalid bid vector has been proven to be valid then one of two things
must have happened. Either the bidder publishing the vector has managed to
publish a proof that an item is an encryption of a 1 or a Z when it is not, or the
decryption of the shares published by the auctioneers is shown to decrypt to Z
when it does not.
In the first instance a bidder could prove an item decrypts to 1 or Z when it
does not with probability 1/q. Even if the bidder managed to achieve this for one
item in the bid vector, when the auctioneers decrypt the product of the items it
will no longer equal Z so the bidder would have to change two items in the bid
vector and set them so that the product of the items in the bid vector is still Z. The
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chance of a bidder being able to prove that two items in the bid vector decrypt to
1 or Z when they do not is 1/2q.
In the second instance, the chance of an auctioneer in the group being able to
publish an incorrect share that would cause a problem in the decryption while
still proving it is correct is again 1/q. If more than one auctioneer was malicious,
all the malicious auctioneers would have to publish proofs that their shares are
correct when they are not, again with a chance of 1/q for each share. This is true
even if more than the threshold of auctioneers is malicious.
5.4.3 Zero Knowledge
To check the zero knowledge property of this proof, a simulator S can be con-
structed that completes the following steps on common input p, q, g, y,
AlternateBid = ((A1, B1), ..., (An, Bn)), the share values z1, ..., zn, the public keys
y1, ..., yn, the set of participants I , and Z in the random oracle model:
• S completes the steps of the simulator in Section 3.2.3 for every item (Ai, Bi)
in the alternate bid vector AlternateBidwith inputs p, q, g, y, Ai, Bi, and Z.
• S computes the product Prod of all the items in AlternateBid.
• S completes the steps of the simulator in Section 5.3.4 with input p, q, g,
(Ai, Bi), I , z1, ..., zn, and y1, ..., yn.
• S computes the standard bid vector Bid from AlternateBid.
• S outputs the proof transcripts from the previous steps, Prod, and Bid.
5.5 Zero Knowledge Proof of the Maximum Bid
To calculate the maximum bid for a set of goods, the product of all the bid vec-
tors is taken. This product vector is then decrypted from right to left to find the
first value in the product vector that does not decrypt to 1. This reveals the max-
imum bid while keeping private the values of the lower bids. To prove in zero
knowledge to the group of auctioneers conducting the auction that this is done
correctly, all members of the group will need to compute the product vector on
their own. They can then decrypt the items from right to left and publish zero
knowledge proofs that this decryption has been done correctly using verifiable
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threshold El-Gamal decryption in Section 5.3.1. Every member of the group can
then each independently verify the shares they have received from the other auc-
tioneers and decrypt the values in the bid vector with a high certainty that this
decryption is the correct plain-text.
As this proof is composed of only verifiable decryptions of items, the com-
pleteness, soundness, and zero knowledge properties are the same as for verifi-
able decryption.
5.6 Zero Knowledge Proof of Shift and Randomise
Once the maximum bid m on a link in the path has been calculated, the bid vec-
tors in the next link are shifted right bym places which are taken by encrypted Z
values. The shifted bid vector is then randomised and published. The auctioneer
that calculates the shifted and randomised bid vector of length l can prove this
has been done correctly in zero knowledge by conducting the shift and randomise
using the following steps:
• The auctioneer calculates m encryptions of Z to shift the bid vector and
publishes zero knowledge proofs that these m items are encryptions of Z.
The auctioneer publishes zero knowledge proofs of equality of logarithms
by publishing a proof that they know the value r such that A = gr and
B/Z = yr.
• The auctioneer then shifts the new bid vector right by m places and adds
them encryptions of Z that they have proved in zero knowledge decrypt to
Z and publishes this shifted bid vector to the other auctioneers in the group.
• Auctioneer calculates l encryptions of 1 and publishes zero knowledge proofs
that these l items are encryptions of 1. The auctioneer publishes l zero
knowledge proofs of equality of logarithms by publishing proofs that for
every item l they know the value r such that A = gr and B = yr.
• The auctioneer then publishes these l encryptions of 1 to the other auction-
eers.
• The auctioneer can then calculate and publish the shifted and randomised
bid vector bymultiplying the items in the shifted vector by the l encryptions
of 1.
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As this proof is composed of proof of equality of discrete logarithms the com-
pleteness, soundness, and zero knowledge properties are the same as for the zero
knowledge proof of equality of discrete logarithms shown in Appendix A.2.
5.7 Example Verifiable Combinatorial Auction
Figure 5.1 illustrates a simple threshold combinatorial auction for two goods with
two bidders. There is a group of auctioneers responsible for calculating the auc-
tion result at each node other than the start node of the graph. In this example, a
(2, 3) threshold scheme is being used. The correct winner of the auction is bidder
one with a price of 5 for goods one and two together.
Node 3
Node 2










Bidder 1 Bids 5



























Figure 5.1: Simple Threshold Combinatorial Auction
To perform a group verification that the auction has correctly taken place the
following actions are executed in conjunction with the actions executed to calcu-
late the winner of the auction. If a problem is reported to a public bulletin board
by at least t auctioneers from the (t, n) threshold scheme, then the auction has
failed verification.
1. Bids are encrypted and published in alternate form for every link using the
public key of the link. Bidders also publish zero knowledge proofs that they
are valid. Auctioneers for the link check alternate form bid vectors before
5.7. EXAMPLE VERIFIABLE COMBINATORIAL AUCTION 63
converting them to the standard bid vector form. The process for publishing
and verifying the bid for bidder one on link three is shown in figure 5.2 and






L = 6 zero knowledge proofs that the items 
in the bid vector are encryptions of 1 or Z
Each auctioneer verifies the L proofs that 
the items encrypt 1 or Z.
Each auctioneer calculates the product of 
all the bid vector items
EA3(1)xEA3(1)xEA3(1)xEA3(Z)xEA3(1)xEA3(1)
=EA3(Z)
Auctioneers verifiably decrypt this product, 
publishing zero knowledge proofs of correct 
decryption.
Finally, the bid can be converted in to 
standard form and published on the link
EA3(Z),EA3(Z),EA3(Z),EA3(Z),EA3(1),EA3(1)
Bidder
Figure 5.2: Bid Verification
• The bidder encrypts the bid vector for the value it wants to bid for this
link or combination of goods with the public key of the group of auc-
tioneers responsible for the link. In our example, group A2 is respon-
sible for link two, and group A3 is responsible for links one and three.
When encrypting every item in the alternate bid vector the bidder also
constructs a zero knowledge proof that the item it is encrypting de-
crypts to a 1 or a Z. This encrypted alternate bid vector as well as the
zero knowledge proofs are sent to the auctioneer group.
• The auctioneers in the group verify the zero knowledge proofs that
each item is a 1 or a Z sent by the bidder with the bid.
• Each auctioneer computes the product of all the items in the alternate
bid vector. This can be done correctly by any auctioneer due to the
homomorphic nature of the encryption.
• The auctioneers then each do a verifiable decryption of the product of
the items of the bid vector. If the decrypted product does not decrypt
to Z then this is not a valid bid vector.
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• If this is a valid bid vector, it can be converted in to standard form
by an auctioneer and published on the link. Any other auctioneer can
check this has been done correctly due to the homomorphic nature of
the encryption.
2. Once encrypted bids have been submitted and verified, the auction graph






























































Figure 5.3: Simple Threshold Combinatorial Auction with Encrypted Bids
3. The auctioneers in group A2 find the optimal value for their link and then
shift and randomise the bids on link 2 by this amount. Zero knowledge
proofs are published to the group to prove this has been done correctly. The
actions taken by the auctioneers are shown in Figure 5.4 and can be divided
in to three steps:
• The auctioneers first compute the product of all the bid vectors. This
can be computed by any party due to the homomorphic nature of the
encryption by multiplying the individual items in the bid vector. The
first items in both bid vectors are multiplied together and so on until
the last items.
• From right to left, the items in the product bid vector are decrypted to
find the first item that does not decrypt to 1. Auctioneers can check


























































Figure 5.4: Shift and Randomise by Group A2
the decryption is done correctly by doing a verifiable decryption of the
items.
• One of the auctioneers then shifts and randomises the bid vector for
the next link. In this example, for each of the bid vectors for link 2, the
auctioneer will encrypt a Z value with the public key for group A3 and
publish a zero knowledge proof to the other auctioneers that the item
is an encryption of Z. The auctioneer will then shift the bid vectors
for link 2 right by one item and add the new encryption of Z to the
left hand side of the vector. Finally, the auctioneer will randomise the
shifted bid vector by creating l = 5 encryptions of 1 using the public
key of group A3, publish zero knowledge proofs to the other auction-
eers that these items are an encryption of 1, and multiply the shifted
bid vectors by the encrypted 1 values to randomise them and hide the
number of items in the bid vector that have been shifted.
4. The auctioneers in group A3 find the optimal value for the auction. The
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product of all the bid vectors for link 2 and link 3 are multiplied together
to generate a product vector. The auctioneers for the group A3 will then
decrypt the items in the product vector from right to left to find the first
item that does not decrypt to 1. This value will be the optimal value of this
auction, in this auction the optimal value is 4. The decryption is done using
verifiable decryption so the other auctioneers of the group can check the
share of the decryption published by the other auctioneers.
5. The auctioneers in group A3 find the optimal bid on the optimal path. To
find the optimal bid, the auctioneers will decrypt the individual bid vectors
at the index of the optimal value one by one to find the first bid vector that
decrypts to Z. In this example, the auctioneers would decrypt the shift and
randomised bids for link 2 as well as the bid vectors for link 3 at the index
of the optimal value 4. Only the bid vector from bidder one on link 3would
decrypt to a Z at index 4 showing that the optimal bid is bidder one for
goods 1 and 2. When the decryption is being done, zero knowledge proofs
of correct decryption can be published to the group A3 to provide confi-
dence that the decryption has been done correctly and a correct optimal bid
found.
6. The result of the auction is publicly published and the winners notified.
5.8 Summary
This chapter has shown the group verification protocol for the homomorphic auc-
tion protocol. The threat model and security goals for the group verification pro-
tocol were detailed with the protocol needing to be complete, sound, and zero
knowledge. Details were presented on verifiable threshold El-Gamal decryption,
the individual actions taken in the homomorphic auction protocol, and a simple
example was given. Using the group verification protocol, bidders can have con-
fidence in the auction result as long as less than the threshold t of auctioneers
for each group are malicious. The group verification protocol also increases the
robustness of the protocol as the auctioneers can find invalid bid vectors before
the protocol starts and remove them as well as being able to verify that the de-
cryption shares published by other auctioneers have been performed correctly to
prevent the subvertion of the decryption process.
Chapter 6
Public Verification Protocol
The second iteration of our design for a verification protocol for the homomor-
phic auction protocol is a public verification protocol. Public verification allows
any third party to verify the auction even if they did not participate in the auction
process. By allowing any party to verify the auction and not just the auctioneers
taking part, the verification process is not affected by the number of malicious
auctioneers. Even if more than the threshold value t auctioneers are malicious
there is still a low chance they could incorrectly execute the auction protocol and
publish zero knowledge proofs that are accepted. This is in contrast to the previ-
ous group verification protocol which depended on less than the threshold value
t of auctioneers being malicious for the verification protocol to work.
The threat model for our verification protocol is restated before presenting the
zero knowledge proofs that the bids are valid followed by zero knowledge proofs
of the maximum bid and the shift and randomise action. Finally, these proofs are
put together and an example is presented of a public verification of a simple two
good combinatorial auction.
6.1 Threat Model
It is assumed that the provers and verifiers in our verification protocol are poly-
nomially bounded active adversaries that may try and prove incorrect assertions.
For example, an active adversarial provermay try and convince an honest verifier
that they have correctly computed an incorrect auction result. It is assumed that
any number of polynomially-bounded active adversaries may be colluding to-
gether to disrupt the verification protocol regardless of the threshold value. This
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is in contrast to the group verification protocol where it is assumed that less than
the threshold value t of auctioneers are malicious. Different parties may collude,
so a bidder and an auctioneer may collude together. It is assumed that any party
can get a copy of any public message sent between the auction participants and
use it to try and break the verification protocol similarly to the group verification
protocol in Section 5.1.
6.2 Security Goals
The security goals for the verification protocol are now reviewed in the context
of a public verification protocol for the homomorphic auction protocol.
1. Any party regardless of whether they took part in the auction should be
able to verify the actions of the participants in the auction protocol giving
a high confidence that they have correctly executed the steps in the auction
protocol.
2. Verification of the auction protocol should reveal no extra information other
than what is already revealed by the auction protocol.
3. It should be computationally infeasible for a bidder to submit an invalid bid
that passes the verification checks.
4. It should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to not count all the
bids and pass the verification checks. For the homomorphic auction proto-
col, it should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to not count a
bid when calculating the maximum bid for a node and pass verification.
5. It should be computationally infeasible for an auctioneer to announce an
incorrect winning bidder(s) or price(s) and pass the verification checks. For
the homomorphic auction protocol, it should be computationally infeasible
for an auctioneer to do an incorrect shift and randomise, or incorrectly com-
pute the optimal path once the optimal value is found and pass verification.
6.3 Zero Knowledge Proof of a Valid Bid Vector
The same zero knowledge proofs and techniques that have been used to prove
a bid is valid in the group verification protocol in section 5.4 can be used in the
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public verification protocol.
Bids are publicly published in the alternate version along with zero knowl-
edge proofs that every item in the bid vector decrypts to a 1 or a Z. The product
of all the items in the alternate bid vector is calculated and the auctioneers pub-
licly publish their shares of the decryption of this product along with zero knowl-
edge proofs that their share is correct. Any party can then check the decryption
equals Z using LaGrange interpolation. The alternate bid vector can then be con-
verted in to a standard bid vector, an action that any party can verify due to the
homomorphic nature of El-Gamal, and publicly published.
6.4 Zero Knowledge Proof of the Maximum Bid
To calculate the maximum bid for a node, the auctioneers compute the item wise
product of all the bid vectors on the incoming edges. This can be done due to the
homomorphic nature of the encryption. The auctioneers then decrypt the items
in the product vector from right to left until the first item that does not decrypt
to 1 using the verifiable decryption from Section 5.3.1 where the zero knowledge
proofs that the decryption is done correctly are only published to other auction-
eers in the group. The first item that does not decrypt to 1 is the maximum bid
value m for the node. Once the maximum value m has been found, the auction-
eers decrypt all the individual bid vectors at index m to find the maximum bid
vector Bidmax using the verifiable decryption from Section 5.3.1 where the zero
knowledge proofs that the decryption is done correctly are again only published
to other auctioneers in the group.
To publicly prove in zero knowledge that a bid vector Bidmax is the maximum
bid from the set of bid vectors, one of the auctioneers from the group uses a pub-
licly verifiable shuffle of encrypted values from section 3.2.5. The bid vectors are
all shuffled using the same permutation that is known to the auctioneer that does
the shuffle but remains unknown to everyone else. This permutation is chosen
so that the first item in the shuffled vector is the mth item from the original bid
vector. The auctioneers for the group then publicly publish their shares of the
decryption of the first items in the shuffled bid vectors along with zero knowl-
edge proofs that these shares are correct from Section 5.3.1. Any party can then
compute the Lagrange interpolation on the shares to decrypt the items. The first
item in the maximum bid vector Bidmax should decrypt to Z while the first items
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for all the other bid vectors decrypt to 1. As all the other bids are shown to de-
crypt to 1 and it can be verified that the shuffle of the encrypted values was done
correctly this verifies that all the bids have been counted in the auction and that
the winning bid is the maximum bid. Because of the shuffle applied to the bid
vectors, this verification process reveals no information about the bids other than
what can already be deduced from the assertion that Bidmax is the maximum bid.
The shuffle applied to the bid vectors hides the value of the maximum bid.
If there is a tie for the maximum bid and the shuffled first item of more than
one bid decrypts to Z, it can be proved that it is one of the set of maximum bids
by performing the following steps for every bid vector Othermax with a shuffled
first item that decrypts to Z:
• Calculate the product of all the items inOthermax. For example, if the vector
is E(Z), E(Z), E(1) the product will be E(Z2).
• The auctioneers for the group now divide the product of all the items in
Bidmax by the product computed in the previous step.
• The auctioneers then publicly publish their shares of the decryption of the
result from the division in the previous step together with zero knowledge
proofs that these shares are correct from Section 5.3.1. Any party can then
compute the Lagrange interpolation on the shares to decrypt the items.
• If the decryption of the division is 1 then the vector Othermax is equal to the
vector Bidmax.
These steps will only need to be performed in the case that there is a tie-break
and more than one maximum bid.
6.4.1 An Example
Suppose there are three bids:
• Bid 1: E(Z), E(Z), E(Z), E(1).
• Bid 2: E(Z), E(Z), E(1), E(1).
• Bid 3: E(1), E(1), E(1), E(1).
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Bid 1 is the maximum bid. To prove this one of auctioneers applies a permu-
tation to the bids say pi = (3, 4, 1, 2). After this permutation, the three bids will be
as follows:
• Bid 1: E(Z), E(1), E(Z), E(Z).
• Bid 2: E(1), E(1), E(Z), E(Z).
• Bid 3: E(1), E(1), E(1), E(1).
The auctioneer that performed the shuffle then publishes a zero knowledge
proof that the permutation was correctly applied and that the same permutation
was applied to all the bid vectors. The auctioneers then publish shares of the
decryption of the first items in the shuffled vectors along with proofs that these
shares are correct. Using the shares, a verifier can check that the first item in the
shuffled Bid 1 vector decrypts to Z, while the first item in the other bid vectors
decrypt to 1. As the vectors have been shuffled this reveals no other information
other than the maximum bid to any verifiers.
By using the zero knowledge proof of the maximum bid for a node, both the
auctioneer and any verifying party will learn the index of the bidder that bid the
maximum amount on this link. This is extra information that, unless this link is
on the optimal path, would normally remain unknown. To prevent this infor-
mation leakage, the auction protocol can be run in an anonymous fashion where
bidders use pseudo names to submit bids and the true identity of the bidders
remain secret unless they try and repudiate on their bid. Various techniques for
providing bidder anonymity were briefly described in Section 2.6.
6.4.2 Completeness
The completeness of this proof can be divided in to two sections. The complete-
ness of the zero knowledge proof of the shuffle and the completeness of the ver-
ifiable threshold decryption applied to the first items in the shuffled bid vectors.
The completeness of the shuffle is shown in Section 3.2.5 and the completeness of
the threshold decryption of items is shown in Section 5.3.1.
6.4.3 Soundness
Again, the soundness of this proof can be divided in to the soundness of the
shuffle and the soundness of the decryption. From Sections 3.2.5 and 5.3.1 the
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soundness of this proof is shown to be 1/q.
6.4.4 Zero Knowledge
To check the zero knowledge property of this proof, a simulator S can be con-
structed that completes the following steps on common input p, q, g, y, the bid
vectors from the incoming links, the shuffled bid vectors, the share values z1, ..., zn
for each decryption of the first items in the shuffled bid vectors, the public keys
y1, ..., yn, and the set of participants I used in the decryption in the random oracle
model:
• S outputs the transcript of the simulator of the verifiable shuffle from [17]
with the modifications from Section A.5.3.
• S outputs the transcript for the verifiable threshold El-Gamal shown in Sec-
tion 5.3.4 on input p, q, g, the first item in the shuffled bid vector (A,B), I ,
z1, ..., zn, and y1, ..., yn for every shuffled bid vector.
This simulator does not work in the case that Bidmax is one of a set of max-
imum bids. A simulator for this situation would need some extra steps where
the simulator would calculate the product of the other maximum bid vectors
Othermax and then would divide these by the product of Bidmax. The simula-
tor would then need to output a transcript that the shares published to do this
decryption were correct again using the steps shown in Section 5.3.4.
6.5 Zero Knowledge Proof of Shift and Randomise
Once the auctioneers for a node have published a zero knowledge proof of the
maximum bidMax with valuem, they will have to shift and randomise the bids
on the outgoing links. To shift and randomise a bid vector Old of length l, one
of the auctioneers will need to make m encryptions of Z, shift the bid vector Old
right by m places inserting the new encryptions of Z and randomise the vector
by multiplying every item in the bid vector by different encryptions of the value
1 to create New.
The public zero knowledge proof that this has been done correctly is divided
in to two parts. The first part of the proof involves the auctioneers proving that
the new shifted bid vector New is a valid bid vector. In the second part of the
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proof, the auctioneers publish proofs that New has the same value as Old shifted
right by the amount ofMax.
Before proving the new shifted bid vector New is valid, it is converted from
the standard form to the alternate form presented in Section 5.4. The alternate
form bid vector Alt is formed item wise by computing from right to left:
Alti =
{
Newi if i = l
Newi/Newi+1 otherwise
So if, for example, New = E(Z), E(Z), E(Z), E(1), E(1), E(1) then the conver-
sion will produce Alt = E(1), E(1), E(Z), E(1), E(1), E(1)which is the bid vector
New in the alternate format. Anyone can verify this step has been done correctly
as both the bid vector New and the alternate form Alt are publicly published and
the computation can be checked due to the homomorphic nature of the encryp-
tion.
To publish a zero knowledge proof that the bid vector Alt is valid one of the
auctioneers conducts a random verifiable shuffle of the items in Alt using the
’publicly Verifiable Shuffle of Encrypted Values’ from section 3.2.5. After shuf-
fling the values in Alt, the auctioneers publish their shares of the decryption of
every item in the shuffled alternate form bid vector along with zero knowledge
proofs that the shares are valid using the techniques from Section 5.3.1. A verifier
can then verify the shares and use Lagrange interpolation to decrypt the items in
the shuffled alternate bid vector. Every item in the shuffled alternate bid vector
should decrypt to 1 except for the one Z. This decryption of the items in the shuf-
fled vectors reveals no information about the values of bids as the shuffle hides
the position of the Z value in the alternate bid vector.
Finally, one of the auctioneers publishes the product of all the items in the vec-
tor New as ProductNew. They also publish the product of the items in the vector
Oldmultiplied by the product of all the items in the vectorMax as ProductOldMax.
Any party can verify that these products have been correctly computed due to the
homomorphic nature of the encryption. One of the auctioneers then computes
result = ProductNew/ProductOldMax. The auctioneers then publish their shares of
the decryption of result along with zero knowledge proofs that these shares have
been correctly computed. any party can then verify the shares published by the
auctioneers and that result decrypts to 1 using Lagrange interpolation. If result
decrypts to 1, then the number of encrypted Z values in the vector New is equal
to the number of encrypted Z values in the vectors Old and Max. If all the bid
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vectors are valid this proves that the resulting vector New is the result of a shift
and randomise on Old by the value ofMax.
6.5.1 Completeness
The completeness of this proof is examined in two sections. The first section
addresses the completeness of the proof that New is a valid bid vector, then the
completeness of the proof that New is equal to Old shifted right by the value of
Max is addressed.
The first step of the proof that New is a valid bid vector is complete as it is
multiplication of encrypted values. The completeness of the verifiable shuffle is
shown in Section 3.2.5. The decryption of all the shuffled items in the shuffled
vector is also complete as shown in Section 5.3.1.
The completeness of the calculation of the products of New andMax and Old
are complete as it is multiplication of encrypted values. The calculation of
result = ProductNew/ProductOldMax
is also complete as it is again multiplication of encrypted values. The complete-
ness of proving that result decrypts to 1 follows from the completeness of the
verifiable decryption shown in Section 5.3.1.
6.5.2 Soundness
The soundness of the proof is examined in two steps starting with the proof that
the bid vector New of length l is a valid bid vector and then looking at the proof
that result decrypts to 1.
Suppose a cheating prover wants to construct a bid vector that will be ac-
cepted as a valid bid vector when it is not valid. Given that every item in the
alternate bid vector is decrypted to check if it is a 1 or a Z where only one Z
can be present for it to be valid, one approach for the cheating prover is to try
and construct New in such a way that after it is converted in to alternate form
every item still decrypts to 1 except for one Z while not being a valid bid vector.
As the item at index l in the alternate vector is just the item at index l from the
vector New, then the lth item of New, Newl, must be E(Z) or E(1). The item at
index l − 1 in the alternate bid vector is Altl−1 = Newl−1/Newl. If Newl = E(Z)
then Altl−1 must be equal to E(1) as only one Z is allowed in the alternate bid
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vector, but if Altl−1 = E(1) and Newl = E(Z) then Newl−1 = Newl ∗ Altl−1 =
E(Z) ∗ E(1) = E(Z) so Newl−1 must be E(Z) for all subsequent items in the bid
vector. If Newl = E(1) then Altl−1 can be equal to E(Z) or E(1) which means
that Newl−1 can be equal to E(Z) or E(1). This argument can be continued for all
items in the bid vector New to show that New must be a valid bid vector if the
decryption is done correctly.
If a cheating prover wants to do an incorrect decryption of a shuffled item
to show it decrypts to a 1 or a Z when it does not, or to change the items when
doing the shuffle so that the items in Alt and the shuffled Alt are different then
they have to cheat the proof of equality of logarithms or the verifiable shuffle
of encrypted items. The chance of doing this is 1/q as shown in Sections 3.2.5
and 5.3.1 respectively.
The calculation of the products of New and Max and Old are sound as they
are multiplication of encrypted values. The calculation of
result = ProductNew/ProductOldMax
is also sound as again it is a multiplication of encrypted values. If a cheating
prover wants to show that result decrypts to 1 when D(result) 6= 1, they will
have to publish an incorrect share that still passes the verifiable decryption proof.
The chance of doing this is 1/q as shown in Section 5.3.1.
6.5.3 Zero Knowledge
Given the shifted and randomised bid vector New, the alternate form bid vector
Alt, the shuffled alternate bid vector ShuffledAlt, p, q, g, the public keys y1, ..., yn,
the shares of the decryption for the items in ShuffledAlt, and the shares of the
decryption for result, z1,result, ..., zn,result the zero knowledge property of this proof
can be checked by constructing a simulator S that completes the following steps
in the random oracle model:
• S outputs the transcript of the simulator for the verifiable shuffle from [17]
with themodifications from SectionA.5.3 on the input ofAlt and ShuffledAlt.
• For each item i in ShuffledAlt, S outputs the transcript of the simulator
from the verifiable threshold El-Gamal shown in Section 5.3.4 on input p, q,
g, ShuffledAlt,i, I , z1,i, ..., zn,i, and y1, ..., yn.
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• S then outputs the transcript of the simulator from the verifiable threshold
El-Gamal shown in Section 5.3.4 on input p, q, g, result, I , z1,result, ..., zn,result,
and y1, ..., yn.
6.6 Example Verifiable Combinatorial Auction
Figure 6.1 illustrates a simple combinatorial auction for two goods with two bid-
ders as used in Section 5.7. There is a group of auctioneers responsible for calcu-
lating the auction result at each node other than the start node of the graph. In
this example, a (2, 3) threshold scheme is being used. The correct winner of the
auction is bidder one with a price of 5 for goods one and two together.
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Figure 6.1: Simple Threshold Combinatorial Auction
To perform a public verification that the auction has correctly taken place the
following actions are executed in conjunction with the actions executed to calcu-
late the winner of the auction. Any party can verify the proofs that are published
to a public bulletin board.
1. Bids are encrypted and published in alternate form for every link using the
public key of the node responsible for the link. Bidders publicly publish
zero knowledge proofs that every item in the alternate bid vector decrypts
to a 1 or a Z. The auctioneers for the node compute the product of the
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items in the alternate bid vectors and publish zero knowledge proofs that































































Figure 6.2: Simple Threshold Combinatorial Auction with Encrypted Bids
2. Figure 6.2 shows the auction graph after the encrypted bids have been sub-
mitted and converted in to standard form.
3. The auctioneers in group A2 then compute the maximum bid for node 2
and shift and randomises the bids on the outgoing link 2 by the maximum
bid amount and publishes zero knowledge proofs that this has been done
correctly for every bid that is shifted and randomised.
4. Figure 6.3 shows the auction graph after the bids for link 2 have been shifted
and randomised.
5. The auctioneers in group A3 then compute the maximum bid m for node 3
which is the optimal path and publish zero knowledge proofs that this was
done correctly.
6. The auctioneers in group A3 decrypt the bids on the incoming links at posi-
tionm and publish proofs that this was done correctly to the bulletin board
using the technique from Section 5.3.1.






























































Figure 6.3: Simple Threshold Combinatorial Auction after the Shift and Ran-
domise
6.7 Summary
This chapter presented a public verification protocol for the homomorphic auc-
tion protocol. We have restated the threat model and security goals for the public
verification protocol, which are similar to those in the group verification proto-
col. While the group verification protocol relies on less than the threshold t of
auctioneers for each group being malicious, the public verification protocol can
detect malicious auctioneers even when all the auctioneers in a group are mali-
cious. The public verification presented in this chapter will be computationally
expensive. The proofs of the maximum bid and shift and randomise require a
verifiable shuffle to be performed on each vector where each shuffle requires 18n
modular exponentiations where n is the length of the bid vector. The public ver-




Throughout this thesis arguments have been made on the completeness, sound-
ness, and zero knowledge of the zero knowledge proofs being used in the pub-
lic and group verification protocols. These arguments apply when the proofs
are used individually but what happens in the auction protocol where different
types of proofs are combined and computed multiple times. For example, an auc-
tioneer in the group verification protocol will have to prove for every decryption
required in the protocol that their share is correctly computed. Will the combina-
tion of all these proofs enable an attacker to extract information about the secret
key of the auctioneer?
The original definition of zero knowledge and the simulator presented in Sec-
tion 3.1 is not zero knowledge under sequential composition. A stronger notion
of the simulator for zero knowledge called black-box simulation is zero knowl-
edge under sequential composition. A black-box simulator requires the existence
of a universal simulator that given any verifier can simulate the interaction be-
tween the prover and the verifier [20]. As our proofs are non-interactive zero
knowledge, the transcript involves a message sent from the prover to the veri-
fier containing the proof transcript followed by a one bit output from the verifier
specifying whether the proof was accepted or not. The simulators constructed
throughout this thesis are black-box simulators as the simulator constructs the
proof transcript from the prover to the verifier and can then run the verifier on
the transcript to see if it accepts the proof transcript or not. This is possible be-
cause the verifier is entirely deterministic and has no random value, otherwise
the simulators would need adapting to be black-box simulators. It is worth not-
ing that all known zero knowledge protocols are in fact black-box simulator zero
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knowledge [21].
7.1 Passive Adversaries
A passive adversarial prover has few options, as by definition they cannot devi-
ate from the protocol. A passive adversarial auctioneer for a particular node in
the auction graph will learn the maximum bid value for that node, but this is a
limitation of the homomorphic auction protocol and not linked to the verification
scheme.
A verifier that is honest but curious may record all the transcripts of the proofs
it verifies and use this information to try and extract extra information. Since
the zero knowledge proofs presented in this thesis are black-box simulator zero
knowledge they are closed under sequential composition. As these proofs are
closed under composition, an honest but curious verifier could gain no extra in-
formation by recording the transcripts of all the proofs that they have taken part
in.
7.2 Active Adversaries
Aprover that is an active adversarymay try and convince a verifier of the validity
of a false assertion. To do this the prover must be able to construct a proof that
is not sound. The soundness of the zero knowledge proofs presented has been
examined and the chance of a prover being able to prove an invalid statement is
1/q where q is a parameter of the El-Gamal encryption used. The smallest key
size used is 128 bits long and so |q| = 128. This makes the probability of the
prover presenting a proof of an invalid assertion 1/2128. Given that the number of
possible keys for the El-Gamal encryption is 2128 the possibility that an auctioneer
could break the encryption used on the bids and decrypt all the bids on the same
link is the same as the probability of an auctioneer being able to present a proof
of an invalid assertion that is accepted by a verifier.
When conducting zero knowledge proofs, a verifier that is an active adversary
may try and formulate challenges for the prover in such a way that it can learn
more than the validity of the assertion being proved. If a verifier was to succeed
in learning more information then the proof would not be zero knowledge.
Zero knowledge proofs such as the proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm
7.3. COLLUDING PARTIES 81
and the proof of equality of discrete logarithms have the property of witness ex-
traction. In a proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm the prover knows a
secret value x such that y = gx where y and g are publicly known. The proof
transcript, or the data transferred, consists of three values; a the commitment, c
the challenge, and r the response. If the same commitment value is used for two
proofs, but a different challenge and response are issued a witness to the knowl-
edge being proved can be extracted. Given two proof transcripts with values a,
c1, r1 and a, c2, r2, and it is known that g




loggv = r1 − r2/c1 − c2 = x
Clearly, this should be avoided where a verifier can extract the secret value from
the prover. As the challenge c is being generated from the random oracle on input
a, there is no way for the random oracle to provide two different answers to the
same challenge as the cryptographic hash function used is deterministic. This
means the proofs should never provide enough information to allow a malicious
party to extract a witness to the proof of knowledge.
7.3 Colluding Parties
Suppose some parties in the protocol were colluding to try and subvert the auc-
tion protocol. What would be the effect on the verification protocols? There are
four main possibilities. A bidder could be colluding with an auctioneer, a prover
and verifier could be colluding, a group of auctioneers could be colluding to-
gether, and a group of auctioneers could be colluding with a group of bidders.
Suppose a bidder and an auctioneer were colluding to try and accept a bid that
was not valid. In the group verification protocol, to be accepted the bid would be
required to pass the verification on at least the threshold amount t of auctioneers.
This would require t auctioneers to be corrupt and the group verification proto-
col is only correct as long as less than t auctioneers are malicious. In the public
verification protocol the collusion of a bidder and an auctioneer would be of no
advantage when trying to get an invalid bid accepted as any other third party can
also verify the proof and will see that the bid is invalid.
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When using the public verification protocol, a verifier and a prover could col-
lude to accept a proof that is incorrect. For example, suppose there is an auction
where there is one verifier that checks the auction that is colluding with one of
the auctioneers. If one of the auctioneers did an incorrect shift and randomise
and the verifier incorrectly reported that the zero knowledge proof for the shift
and randomise was accepted when it was not, any other parties relying on the
output verifier would have a misplaced confidence in the auction result. Any
party that wants to verify the result should compute the verification themselves
and not rely on the output of another verifier as they could be providing false
information.
Suppose a group of auctioneers were colluding to try and subvert the auction
protocol. In the group verification protocol, it would require a group of at least
the size of the threshold of auctioneers to successfully subvert the auction process.
A group of auctioneers with less members than the threshold would be detected
by the honest auctioneers. In the public verification protocol, a group of auction-
eers colluding would still have to publish proofs that would be accepted by a
third party verifier that would require them to publish zero knowledge proofs of
an incorrect assertion. The chance of being able to prove an incorrect assertion
is 1/q where q is a parameter of the El-Gamal encryption. The only benefit of
having a group of auctioneers colluding would be the increased computational
power when doing a brute force attack. If a bidder was also to collude with the
group of auctioneers it would have the same effect as the bidder would still need
to publish zero knowledge proofs that were accepted by the threshold number of
auctioneers in the group verification protocol or, in the public verification proto-
col, by a third party verifier.
7.4 The Random Oracle Model
This thesis has presented non-interactive zero knowledge proofs that are secure
in the random oracle model, but how secure is the random oracle model? This
is a question that has received much attention in current research work. On the
one hand there is the result that there exist signature and encryption schemes that
are secure in the random oracle model but for which any implementation of the
random oracle results in an insecure scheme [8]. This implies not just a weak-
ness with the hash function used but a weakness in the random oracle model as
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the schemes are insecure under any implementation of the hash function. On the
other hand, the random oracle model has been used to construct practical secure
schemes where there is no currently known exploit [8]. The main conclusion of
this work points to the random oracle model being a useful tool for constructing
practical proofs that can eliminate a broad range of attacks but it is not a guaran-
tee that no attacks exist.
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Chapter 8
Results and Analysis
This chapter presents a complexity analysis of the group and public verification
protocols. The details of the implementation of the group verification protocol
and the garbled circuits auction protocol are then discussed. Performance results
are then presented for the group verification protocol, the original homomorphic
auction protocol, and the garbled circuits auction protocol. These results are then
analysed and the three auction protocols are compared based on their perfor-
mance and security properties.
8.1 Complexity
To compare the performance of the public and group verification schemes for the
homomorphic auction protocol their complexity can be examined based on the
number of exponentiations needed to complete them. This complexity is based
on computing the proofs and does not include the verification process. It is as-
sumed that there are 2g links in the graph where g is the the number of goods,
b is the number of bidders, n is the number of auctioneers, and l the maximum
bid for a link. Table 8.1 presents the upper bound of the complexity of the two
schemes.
As can be seen from the table, the upper bound on the number of modular
exponentiations for the public verification is significantly more than for the group
verification. This shows that the public verification protocol will be significantly
more expensive in terms of both computation and communication than the group
verification protocol. The public verification protocol would in all likelihood only
be used in auctions of very high value goods such as auctions for radio spectrum.
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Proof Group Public
Valid Bids 2gb(7 + 2n) 2gb(7 + 2n)
Max Bid 2g2ln 2gb(18l + 2)
Shift and Randomise 2g4bl 2gb(20n+ 2nl)
Find Winning Bids 2g2bn 2g2bn
Total 2g+2b(7 + 4n+ 4l) + 2ln 2g+2b(9 + 24n+ 18l + 2ln)
Table 8.1: Complexity
8.2 Implementation
All implementation was done in Java with the following sections detailing the
implementation of the protocols and the testing environment.
8.2.1 Combinatorial Garbled Circuit Auction Protocol
The circuits are implemented as a class with an array of node objects where a node
is a representation of a Boolean gate. To execute a circuit, the circuit object loops
through the array of node objects until they have all been executed. A node object
will only execute if all of it’s parent node objects have executed or it is an input
node, as described in Section 4.2.3. A circuit object can be created by any party in
the garbled circuit auction protocol by using an implementation of the algorithm
described in Section 4.3.2 and can be garbled using an implementation of the
algorithm described in Section 4.2.2. The VPOT protocol was also implemented
which is used by the auctioneer to find the garbled inputs to the garbled circuit.
The implementation of VPOT was based on the protocol described in a paper by
Juels and Szydlo [28].
The auction issuer, auctioneer, and bidder were then implemented as separate
processes. The auctioneer starts the auction and requests a garbled circuit object
from the auction issuer passing it the number of bidders, number of goods, and
the maximum bid for the auction. The auction issuer creates a garbled circuit
object, and returns this along with the output mapping for the circuit to the auc-
tioneer. The auctioneer, auction issuer, and bidder all execute the VPOT protocol
to find the garbled input values to the garbled circuit. Finally the auctioneer ex-
ecutes the garbled circuit using the algorithm described above and publishes the
output of the garbled circuit when translated by the output mapping. The bid-

























Figure 8.1: UML Diagram of Proofs
makes it be possible to test the auction protocol with a large number of bidders
as a thread per bidder has less system requirements than a process per bidder.
As part of his masters thesis Wayne Thomson has designed and implemented
a generalised auction framework (GAF) [49]. GAF provides a framework to im-
plement auction protocols and compare their performance. Wayne has ported
my implementation of the extended garbled circuit auction protocol to the GAF
as a test case for his framework.
8.2.2 Verifiable Homomorphic Auction Protocol
The group verification protocol was first implemented as a prototype that was
able to verify the result of a two good homomorphic auction whose result and
process were hard coded. To create the prototype, the zero knowledge proofs
used in the verification protocols were implemented using an abstract base class
called Proof that all the individual proofs extend as shown in Figure 8.1. The
implementation of the proofs made extensive use of the Java class BigInteger
for the modular arithmetic required for the zero knowledge proofs. The proofs
have been implemented as described in Chapter 3 with the random oracle imple-
mented using the secure Java MessageDigest SHA-512 implementation.
After successful testing of the prototype group verification protocol, it needed
to be applied to a full implementation of the homomorphic auction protocol in
a real system. Wayne has implemented a threshold version of the homomorphic
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auction protocol in GAF. I have extended Wayne’s implementation of the homo-
morphic auction protocol to implement the group verification protocol.
This involved four main changes:
• Bidder Behaviour: Bidders were extended to publish proofs that every item
in the bid vector they have constructed is a 1 or a Z.
• Auctioneers Finding the Optimal Value: Auctioneers were extended to pub-
lish zero knowledge proofs that their shares of the decryption of the product
of the bids on incoming links are valid. When doing the decryption, auc-
tioneers verify the proofs of the shares before doing the decryption.
• Auctioneers Doing Shift and Randomise: Auctioneers were extended to
publish zero knowledge proofs that the shift and randomise operation was
done correctly and these are verified by the other auctioneers.
• Auctioneers Finding the Optimal Path: Auctioneers were extended to pub-
lish zero knowledge proofs that their shares of the decryption when finding
the optimal path are valid. When doing the decryption, auctioneers verify
the proofs of the shares before doing the decryption.
8.2.3 Test Environment
With the original homomorphic auction protocol, the group verification protocol,
and the garbled circuits auction protocol in the same framework tests can be run
to compare the protocols while they are executing in a similar environment with
similar communication overheads.
Figure 8.2 shows the testing setup for the garbled circuit auction protocol. The
garbled circuit auction protocol has three main components, the auctioneer, the
auction issuer, and the bidders. The first test server in the setup ran the GAF com-
ponent the auction composer that is used to control the auction and run a group
of test cases. The second test server ran the auctioneer. The third test server ran
the auction issuer. The fourth test server ran the GAF components bid publisher,
result publisher, and the auction publisher. These components are used by GAF
to signal events in the auction. For example, the auction publisher publishes the
result of the auction to any registered listeners. Two bidders were run on each
test server and these bidders are able to use multiple threads to simulate multiple
























Figure 8.2: Garbled Circuit Auction Protocol Test Setup
to one hundred bidders. Bids in the garbled circuit auction protocol were chosen
at random from any value less that the maximum bid. The values of bids does
not affect the running time of the garbled circuit auction protocol as the size of the
circuit and the auction running time are only affected by the number of bidders,
the size of the maximum bid, and the number of goods.
Figure 8.3 shows the testing setup for the homomorphic auction protocol and
the group verification protocol. Both of these protocols have several main com-
ponents, the auctioneer who runs the auction, the evaluators who calculate the
result of the auction, and the bidders. The number of evaluators is at least equal
to the size of the threshold scheme used. In our test we used a (2, 3) thresh-
old scheme and four evaluators. Only three of these evaluators will be used in
any one auction, there is an extra evaluator available in case one fails. The first
test server in the setup ran the GAF components the auction composer and the
bid publisher as well an auction evaluator. The second test server ran the GAF
component bid publisher and an auction evaluator. The third test server ran the
auctioneer. The fourth test server ran an auction evaluator. The fifth test server
ran the GAF component auction publisher as well as an auction evaluator. Two
bidders were run on each test server in the same way as in the garbled circuits
auction protocol and these bidders are able to use multiple threads to simulate
multiple bidders. The bids in the homomorphic auction protocol and the group
verification protocol were chosen differently to the bids in the garbled circuit auc-
tion protocol. The bids were chosen to be randomly either one or two. The reason
































Figure 8.3: Homomorphic Auction and Group Verification Protocol Test Setup
for this is that for both the homomorphic auction protocol and the group verifica-
tion protocol the execution time of the auction is affected by the values of the bids.
When calculating the maximum bid for a link, the product vector is decrypted
from right to left. If the maximum bid being decrypted is high, less decryption
need to be done to find the value and so this will be quicker than if the bid is
low. This is especially true for the group verification protocol where more proofs
of equality will need to be calculated and published for low value bids. The low
values were chosen so the results show the lower bounds on performance.
8.3 Verification Tests
In some runs of the auction protocol, some of the provers cheat to make sure that
the verification schemes detect parties that do not adhere to the auction protocol.
These tests check whether the group verification protocol can detect invalid bids,
incorrect decryption shares published by auctioneers, and an auctioneer incor-
rectly doing a shift and randomise. The tests are repeated three times and the
number of deviations the verification schemes detect are recorded.
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Problem Detected by Group
Invalid Bid 3 of 3
Invalid Decryption Share 3 of 3
Invalid Shift and Randomise 3 of 3
Table 8.2: Verification Tests
8.4 Verification Performance Results
The computers used for the performance tests were Dell Optiplex GX755s with an
Intel Core 2 Duo processor and 2048MB DDR SDRAM. Each test was run thirty
times and the average time was taken. A default key size of 128 bits was chosen
for the homomorphic auction protocol and the group verification protocol to try
and make them comparable, in terms of their privacy preserving properties, to
the garbled circuit auction protocol which uses a random function with an output
of 128 bits. In the following tests one parameter of the auction protocol is varied
and the performance is tested. All other parameters remain the same. The default
values for the parameters are:
Parameter Setting
Number of Bidders 10
Maximum Bid 16
Number of Goods 3
Key Size (for the verification protocols only) 128
Table 8.3: Default Test Parameters
All tests record the total auction time. For the garbled circuit auction protocol
this includes the time taken to generate and garble the circuit as well as the time
taken to compute the VPOT protocol to find the garbled inputs of the circuit. For
the group verification protocol this includes the time taken by bidders to encrypt
and submit bids as well as the time taken by the auctioneers to calculate the result
of the auction, publish zero knowledge proofs that their actions are correct, and
verify the actions of the other auctioneers.
8.4.1 Number of Bidders
Figure 8.4 shows the effect on auction time of increasing the bidders. Increasing
the number of bidders causes linear growth in the time taken to compute the
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Figure 8.4: Number of Bidders vs Time Taken for Auction
auction. This is because increasing the number of bidders increases the work
done to compute the auction protocol linearly. The group verification protocol
adds a significant overhead to the original protocol but still has a largely linear
growth. The extra overhead is mainly due to the extra proofs and verification
that needs to be done to prove all the bidders are submitting valid bid vectors as
well as the extra proofs that need to be computed to calculate the optimal path
through the graph once the optimal value has been found.
The group verification result for forty bidders seems to show a greater than
linear growth. This is caused by the standard deviation of the results for forty
and fifty bidders being quite broad. The larger spread of values for forty and fifty
bidders could have been caused by other background processes running on the
test PCs or by the bidder test PCs having a more variable execution time due to
the increased memory demands of the extra proofs and extra threads required for
more bidders.
8.4.2 Maximum Price
The effect on auction time of increasing the maximum bid is shown in Figure 8.5.
Increasing the maximum bid results in exponential growth of the time taken to
compute the auction result. This is true for both the original homomorphic auc-
tion protocol and the group verification protocol. The group verification protocol
has a slowing exponential growth where the effects of increasing the maximum
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Figure 8.5: Maximum Bid vs Time Taken for Auction
price from 16 to 64 seems to have more effect than increasing it from 64 to 256.
It is worth noting that the maximum bid was measured in powers of two so the
bid vector lengths tested were 16, 32, 64, 128, and 256 so as to be comparable to
the garbled circuit results. Using a linear scale for the tests for the maximum bid
would providemore data points tomore closely examine the slowing exponential
growth.
8.4.3 Key Size
Figure 8.6 shows the effect of increasing the key size used in the El-Gamal en-
cryption on the auction time. The time taken increases exponentially as the key
size is increased. This is due to the extra computation requirements of operating
on the larger encrypted values. The original homomorphic auction protocol does
not seem to increase when using a key size from 128 bits to 384 bits and only
seems to experience exponential growth for key sizes greater than 384. A mini-
mum overhead created by the communication costs of the protocol may influence
the time taken to compute the auction more than the computational requirements
of computing with larger numbers up to a key size of 384. This is also reflected
in the group verification protocol where the exponential growth seems to happen
for key sizes greater than 256. As there is more computation done on the larger
numbers in the group verification protocol it would have an affect on the auction
time for smaller key sizes than the original homomorphic auction protocol.
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Figure 8.6: Key Size vs Time Taken for Auction
8.4.4 Number of Goods
Figure 8.7 shows the effect of increasing the number of goods on the auction time.
Both the original homomorphic auction protocol and the group verification pro-
tocol have exponential growth in auction time as goods are increased. This is due
to the increase in the number of allocations and hence the auction graph increas-
ing exponentially with the number of goods. With 2 goods there are 4 possible
allocations but when the number of goods is increased to 3 there are 8 possible
allocations. This is known as the combinatorial auction problem (CAP) which is
NP complete and exponential. The original homomorphic auction protocol seems
to be exponential with an increasing slope as more goods are added. Although a
straight line in this graph would be expected as the goods increase, the increase
could be added due to some inefficiency in the original homomorphic implemen-
tation such as an inefficient graph creation algorithm that results in extra time
taken for each good added. This effect is also shown in the results for the group
verification protocol where the time taken grows exponentially with an increase
for every good added. As this occurs in the homomorphic auction protocol is
does not seem to be a product of the group verification protocol. There is no re-
sult for the group verification protocol for five goods as the Java version usedwas
restricted to a maximum of 734MB of memory per process and the evaluators for
the group verification protocol require more memory.
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Figure 8.7: Number of Goods vs Time Taken for Auction
8.5 Garbled Circuits Performance Results
8.5.1 The Number of Bidders
The time taken to complete the auction increases linearly as the number of bid-
ders increases as shown in Figure 8.8. This is due to the linear growth in the
number of nodes in the circuit needed to compute the auction.
8.5.2 The Maximum Bid
Figure 8.9 shows the time taken to complete the auction when the maximum bid
is increased. Increasing the number of bits in the price by one bit increases the
maximum price by a power of two.
8.5.3 The Number of Goods
Figure 8.10 shows the time taken to complete the auction increasing exponentially
as the number of goods increases.
8.6 Garbled Circuit Size
One of the drawbacks often mentioned about garbled circuits is the size of the
garbled circuit that is sent from the auction issuer to the auctioneer. The authors
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Figure 8.8: Number of Bidders vs Time Taken for Auction
Figure 8.9: Maximum Bid vs Time Taken for Auction
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Figure 8.10: Number of Goods vs Time Taken for Auction
of the original paper suggest that the garbled circuits may need to be sent on CD
or DVD rather than over the network due to their size [36]. To calculate the size of
the auction circuit, the number of two input gates is recorded and multiplied by
4 and then by 128. This is because for every two input gate there are four entries
in the gate table and every entry is the size of the output of the random function
which in this case is 128 bits. The size of the output mapping is not included in
this calculation.
Figure 8.11 shows the size of the garbled circuit increasing linearly as the
number of bidders increases. The size of the garbled circuit is proportional to
ln(Maximum Bid) as shown in Figure 8.12. Figure 8.13 shows the size of the gar-
bled circuit increasing exponentially as the number of goods increases.
The size of the garbled circuits in these tests would not require a CD or DVD to
be sent from the auction issuer to the auctioneer. For example, for an auction with
3 goods, a maximum price of 16, and 100 bidders the size of the garbled circuit is
about 6MB. It is worth noting that construction of a more compact combinatorial
auction circuit with less nodes would decrease the size of the garbled circuit to be
sent.
8.7 Combined Performance Results
Figure 8.14 shows the time taken to compute the auction for the original homo-
morphic auction protocol, the group verification protocol, and the garbled cir-
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Figure 8.11: Garbled Circuit Size vs Number of Bidders
Figure 8.12: Garbled Circuit Size vs Maximum Bid
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Figure 8.13: Garbled Circuit Size vs Number of Goods
Figure 8.14: Number of Goods vs Time Taken for Auction
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cuits auction protocol. The homomorphic auction protocol has the best perfor-
mance although if the trend of increasing exponential growth continues the gar-
bled circuit auction protocol may be quicker for larger numbers of goods. The
group verification protocol has the worst performance of the three auction pro-
tocols, but is comparable to garbled circuits especially when computing auctions
for two or three goods.
8.8 Analysis of Different Schemes
In this chapter the performance of the original homomorphic auction protocol,
the group verification protocol, and the garbled circuit auction protocol have been
shown. The group verification protocol takes the longest time of the three pro-
tocols and the original homomorphic auction protocol takes the least. Although
the group verification protocol adds a significant overhead to the homomorphic
auction protocol it also increases the robustness of the protocol by allowing the
auction protocol to complete even in the presence of less than t malicious auc-
tioneers. If a malicious auctioneer is a common problem, the group verification
protocol may have better performance than the original protocol as the original
protocol would either return an incorrect auction result or need to restart if amali-
cious auctioneer was present. The group verification protocol is also more robust
than the garbled circuits protocol where if one of the two parties is malicious or
fails the auction would need to be restarted.
The garbled circuit auction protocol has better performance than either the
original homomorphic auction protocol or the group verification protocol when
a large maximum bid is required. The bid vector notation used in the homomor-
phic auction protocol causes an exponential increase in the time taken to com-
pute the auction whereas the garbled circuits auction protocol experiences a lin-
ear growth in the time taken to compute the auction when the maximum bid is
increased by a factor of 2. For auctions where a high bid granularity is required
the garbled auction protocol may be the best choice. It is worth noting that the
maximum bid for an auction is divided by the number of goods for all three auc-
tion protocols. This is because for an auction with say three goods, the longest
path through the auction graph would be the allocation of each good individu-
ally. If each individual good had the maximum bid value bid for it, the total at
the end of the auction would be three times the maximum bid. For this reason the
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actual maximum bid for an auction isMaxBidactual = MaxBid/NumberofGoods.
The garbled circuit auction protocol uses a random function to mask the in-
termediate values of the circuit and provide privacy. To increase the size of the
output of this function would require changes to the protocol and a change of
the hash function being used. The homomorphic auction protocol and the group
verification protocol can increase the key size used and to protect the privacy
of bids in the auction as a parameter. This means that both the homomorphic
auction protocol and the group verification protocol are more flexible with their
privacy level provided and so for auctions that require a different levels of pri-
vacy the homomorphic auction protocol or group verification protocol would be
better choices than the garbled circuit auction protocol.
The group verification protocol has stronger verification properties than the
garbled circuit protocol. The chance of an active malicious auctioneer being able
to force an incorrect auction result undetected by the group verification protocol
is 1/q. For the garbled circuits, the chance of a malicious auction issuer being able
to force an incorrect auction result when using the cut and choose verification
check that the garbled circuit sent by the auction issuer to the auctioneer is valid
is 1/n where n is the number of circuits sent by the auction issuer to the auction-
eer. For 1/n to be equal to 1/q the auction issuer would need to send q copies of
the garbled circuit to the auctioneer. If each circuit is 6MB and q is a 128 bit num-
ber the auction issuer would need to send 6 ∗ 2128MB of data to the auctioneer
which is clearly infeasible. The increased time taken to compute the group veri-
fication protocol gives stronger verification properties and so more confidence in
the auction result. In auctions where strong verification properties are required
the group verification protocol would be the ideal choice. Providing strong verifi-
cation also encourages more bidders to take part and so can increase the revenue
from sellers which would encourage more sellers to take part. If sellers also have
confidence in the auction result it can encourage more sellers to take part as the
problem of the malicious auctioneer has been minimised.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
Online auctions have become a widely accepted way of trading goods and ser-
vices. One outstanding local example is the New Zealand auction site TradeMe
which features over a million listings with more than one and a half million reg-
istered users. However, such single good auctions are limited in their ability to
express alternatives, compromises or synergy between several goods being auc-
tioned, that is, the net worth of certain goods may increase when combined with
other goods. Online combinatorial auctions have been used extensively to allo-
cate truckload transportation and for industrial procurement auctions.
A significant problem with using auctions is the reliance on the trustworthi-
ness of the auctioneer. There is often no means of checking whether the auction-
eer has correctly executed the auction without making all bids public, and bid
information is potentially commercially sensitive. In current systems this trust
is often placed in a central organisation such as TradeMe or the Federal Com-
munications Commission. However, cryptographic techniques can be utilised to
provide even stronger guarantees and assurances. The auctioneer can be pre-
vented from breaking privacy guarantees by using a privacy preserving auction
where the values of bids are hidden using encryption or obfuscation yet can still
be compared to find the winner.
9.1 Contributions and Conclusions
The first contribution of this thesis is a taxonomy reflecting the current state of
research into cryptographically secure auctions. In developing this taxonomy it
became clear that there was no existing auction scheme that was both verifiable
103
104 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
and capable of supporting combinatorial auctions. Two alternative solutions be-
came clear; an existing verifiable auction scheme could be extended to support
combinatorial auctions, or an existing combinatorial scheme could be extended
to add verifiability. This thesis has explored both of these alternatives.
The second contribution of this thesis was therefore to extend an existing ver-
ifiable privacy preserving auction protocol by Naor, Pinkas, and Sumner [36] to
conduct combinatorial auctions. A new auction circuit was designed and imple-
mented to extend the garbled circuits auction protocol to support combinatorial
auctions. Previously published work had only used the garbled circuit auction
protocol to conduct single good (M+1)st price auctions. The construction of the
auction circuit involved combining previous work in construction of circuits with
some of the techniques used in the homomorphic auction protocol to create an
algorithm for constructing a circuit composed of Boolean gates to conduct a com-
binatorial auction based on the number of bidders, goods, and the maximum bid.
These combinatorial garbled circuits have been shown to be a reasonable size
(6MB for an auction with 3 goods, a maximum price of 16, and 100 bidders) to
send over the network, a previous criticism of the garbled circuit auction proto-
col.
The third and most significant contribution of this thesis was to add verifica-
tion to an existing privacy preserving combinatorial auction protocol by Suzuki
and Yokoo [53]. In particular, a group and public verification protocol for the
homomorphic auction protocol was developed. The verification protocols use
zero knowledge proofs to verify the actions taken to compute the auction. The
verification protocols have been shown to be secure in the random oracle model.
The group verification protocol achieves it’s security goals by using zero knowl-
edge proofs to check the actions taken by other parties in the auction protocol.
The group verification protocol reveals no information other than that which is
revealed by the original auction protocol. It has been shown that it is compu-
tationally infeasible for either a bidder or an auctioneer to publish a valid zero
knowledge proof of an incorrect action. The chance of a prover being able to
cheat the zero knowledge proofs is 1/q where q is a parameter of the El-Gamal
encryption and |q| ≥ 128. The public verification protocol achieves it’s security
goals by giving any third party a mechanism to check the actions taken by parties
in the auction protocol. The public verification protocol does reveal what bidder
made the highest bid but this can be hidden by using a bidder anonymity scheme.
Again, it has been shown that it is computationally infeasible for either a prover
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to publish a valid zero knowledge proof of an incorrect action with the chance of
a cheating prover proving an invalid assertion as 1/q. The verification protocols
make it computationally infeasible for a malicious auctioneer to subvert the auc-
tion process preventing the malicious auctioneer and bid filtering. By preventing
themalicious auctioneer and bid filtering the verification protocols provide a high
degree of confidence in the result of an auction to both bidders and sellers. The
verification protocols also increase the robustness of the homomorphic auction
protocol by giving auctioneers the ability to detect and ignore invalid decryp-
tion shares published by other auctioneers where they would have resulted in an
incorrect decryption.
Both the group verification protocol and the garbled circuit auction protocol
have been implemented and tested. While the group verification protocol has
added a significant overhead to the performance of the original homomorphic
auction protocol and is slower than the garbled circuit auction protocol, it has
strong verification properties that can give bidders and sellers confidence in the
result of the auction protocol. The group verification protocol has stronger verifi-
cation than the garbled circuit auction protocol where the amount of data needed
to be sent to perform the cut and choose verification to the same soundness level
would be prohibitive. The group verification protocol can be computed in a rea-
sonable (45 seconds for an auction with 3 goods, a maximum price of 16, and 10
bidders) time and is a practical auction protocol for real world auctions that im-
proves on the security properties of the original homomorphic auction protocol.
9.2 Future Work
9.2.1 Improving Performance of Verification Protocols
The group and public verification protocols presented in this thesis are compu-
tationally expensive. This is particularly true of the public verification protocol.
Work could be done to find quicker ways to prove the actions taken by the auc-
tioneer, particularly the zero knowledge proof of shift and randomise. If a public
verification protocol could be found that did not make such extensive use of the
verifiable shuffle of encrypted items, the performance could be greatly increased.
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9.2.2 Improved Security Analysis
Although a security analysis has been presented for the zero knowledge proofs
used in this thesis, it would be more convincing if the verification protocols could
be shown to be provably secure by comparison with known hard problems. An-
other option to provide greater confidence in the security of the verification pro-
tocols would be to run them in a state checker that could check for any possible
states that leak information or allow a malicious auctioneer to pass the verifica-
tion.
9.2.3 Improved Combinatorial Auction Circuit
The combinatorial auction circuit presented in this thesis, while novel and inter-
esting, may be able to be optimised to increase the performance of the garbled
circuits auction protocol as well as reducing the amount of data that needs to
sent over the network.
Appendix A
Zero Knowledge Proofs
A.1 Proof of Knowledge of a Discrete Logarithm
A.1.1 Completeness
This proof is complete as
gr = gz+cx mod q = gzgcx = avc
It is correct to take r mod q as by definition of g, gq = 1 so gq+2 = 1 ∗ g2 = g2 =
gq+2 mod q.
A.1.2 Soundness
Suppose the prover is cheating and trying to convince the verifier that x satisfies
v = gx when v 6= gx. If a cheating prover chooses r at random and correctly
guesses the output of the random oracle c it can set a = grv−c. If it then outputs
the transcript a, r the verifier will accept because avc = grv−cvc = gr. The chance
of a cheating prover correctly guessing the output of the random oracle is 1/q as
there are q different possibilities for the value a that is the input of the random
oracle. A cheating prover could do a brute force over all possible options for the
output of the random oracle in at most q steps, which is the same as the amount
of work required to break the El-Gamal encryption.
A.1.3 Zero Knowledge
To check the zero knowledge property of this proof, a simulator S can be con-
structed that completes the following steps on common input p, q, g, and v in the
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random oracle model:
• S chooses r and c at random and computes a = grv−c.
• S sets the output of the random oracle on input a to c.
• S outputs transcript a, r.
The verifier then checks that gr = avc which holds because
avc = grv−cvc = gr
A.2 Proof of Equality of Discrete Logarithms
A.2.1 Completeness
This proof is complete as
gr1 = g














Suppose the prover is cheating and trying to convince the verifier that x satisfies
v = gx1 and w = g
x
2 when v 6= g
x
1 or w 6= g
x
2 . If a cheating prover chooses r at
random and correctly guesses the output of the random oracle c it can set a =
grv−c and b = gr2w
−c. If it then outputs the transcript a, b, r the verifier will accept
because avc = gr1v
−cvc = gr1 and bw
c = gr2w
−cwc = gr2. The chance of a cheating
prover correctly guessing the output of the random oracle is 1/q.
A.2.3 Zero Knowledge
To check the zero knowledge property of this proof, a simulator S can be con-
structed that completes the following steps on common input p, q, g1, g2, w, and v
in the random oracle model:
• S chooses r and c at random and computes a = gr1v
−c and b = gr2w
−c.
• S sets the output of the random oracle on input a+ b to c.
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• S outputs transcript a, b, r.
The verifier then checks that gr1 = av
c and gr2 = bw






A.3 Proof an Encrypted Item Decrypts to 1 or Z
A.3.1 Completeness
To show completeness the values c = d1 + d2 mod q, a1 = g
r1Ad1 , b1 = y
r1(B/Z)d1 ,
a2 = g
r2Ad2 , and b2 = y
r2Bd2 are all checked to hold for bothM = 1 andM = Z.
IfM = 1:






r2Ad2 = gw−rd2Ac−d1 = gwA−(c−d1)Ac−d1 = gw
b2 = y
r2Bd2 = yw−rd2yrd2 = ywy−rd2yrd2 = yw
IfM = Z:
d2 = c− d1 mod q so c = d1 + d2 mod q
a1 = g
r1Ad1 = gw−rd1Ad1 = gwg−rd1grd1 = gw
b1 = y





So the proof is complete.
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A.3.2 Soundness
Suppose the prover is cheating and trying to convince the verifier that (A,B)
decrypts to 1 or Z when it does not. If a cheating prover chooses d1, r1, r2 at
random and correctly guesses the output of the random oracle c it can set d2 =
c− d1 mod q, a1 = g
r1Ad1 , b1 = y
r1(B/Z)d1 , a2 = g
r2Ad2 , and b2 = y
r2Bd2 . If it then
outputs the transcript (A,B), a1, b1, a2, b2, d1, d2, r1, r2 the verifier will accept. The
chance of a cheating prover correctly guessing the output of the random oracle is
1/q.
A.3.3 Zero Knowledge
To check the zero knowledge property of this proof, a simulator S can be con-
structed that completes the following steps on common input p, q, g, y, A, B, and
Z in the random oracle model:
• S chooses r1, r2, d1 and d2 at random.
• S computes c = d1 + d2 mod q.
• S computes a1 = g
r1Ad1 , b1 = y
r1(B/Z)d1 , a2 = g
r2Ad2 , and b2 = y
r2Bd2 .
• S sets the output of the random oracle on input a1 + a2 + b1 + b2 to c.
• S outputs transcript (A,B), a1, b1, a2, b2, d1, d2, r1, r2.
The verifier then checks that c = d1 + d2 mod q, a1 = g
r1Ad1 , b1 = y
r1(B/Z)d1 ,
a2 = g
r2Ad2 , and b2 = y
r2Bd2 .
A.4 Proof of Equality of Two Logarithm Lists
A.4.1 Completeness
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A.4.2 Soundness


















a cheating prover chooses r1, ...rn at random and correctly guesses the output of
the random oracle c it can set a1 = g
r1
1 v
−c, b1 = m
r1
1 w
−c, ai = m
ri
i and bi = m
ri
i for
i = 2, ..., n. If it then outputs the transcript a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn, r1, ..., rn the verifier
will accept. The chance of a cheating prover correctly guessing the output of the
random oracle is 1/q.
A.4.3 Zero Knowledge
To check the zero knowledge property of this proof, a simulator S can be con-
structed that completes the following steps on common input p, q, g1, ..., gn,m1, ...,mn,
w, and v in the random oracle model:
• S chooses r1, ..., rn and c at random and computes a1 = g
r1
1 v
−c and b1 =
mr11 w
−c.
• S computes ai = g
ri
i and bi = m
ri
i for i = 2, ..., n.
• S sets the output of the random oracle on input a1 + ...an + b1 + ...+ bn to c.
• S outputs transcript a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn, r1, ..., rn.







































A.5 Publicly Verifiable Shuffle of Encrypted Values
A.5.1 Completeness
This poof is complete as stated in [17]. If the prover knows a permutation matrix
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for i = 1, ..., n, it is able to provide values that satisfy the 6 equations checked by
the verifier.
• Proof 1 is checked by equations 2 and 6.
• Proof 2 is checked by equations 2, 4, and 5.
• Proof 3 is checked by equations 1 and 3, as well as the set of randomly
chosen basis.
• Proof 4 is checked using a series of ’Proof of equality of two logarithm lists’
proofs. This step is complete due to the completeness of the ’Proof of equal-
ity of two logarithm lists’ proof.
This proof has been adapted to be non-interactive by changing how the chal-
lenge values ci for i = 1, ..., n are generated. Instead of being generated randomly
by the verifier, these values are now generated by inputting the commit values to
a hash function. This does not affect the completeness property because the proof
is complete for any values of ci in Zq which still holds when ci is generated by a
hash function.
A.5.2 Soundness
A cheating prover can convince a verifier that an incorrect shuffle was done cor-




i = 1 or by guess-
ing the output of the hash function. The probability of a cheating prover knowing
a1, ..., an is 1/q. The probability of guessing the output to the hash function is 1/q.
This gives the shuffle protocol a soundness of 1/q.
A.5.3 Zero Knowledge
The zero knowledge property of this proof is shown in [17]. The proof has been
adapted to be non-interactive which requires one modification to the simulator
constructed to show zero knowledge in the random oracle model. When the chal-
lenge values are chosen randomly from Zq, the simulator will need to set the out-
put of the hash function to the challenge values on the input of the commit values.
This addition gives us a simulator for the verifiable shuffle which shows it is zero
knowledge.
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The zero knowledge property of the ’Proof of equality of two logarithm lists’
used is shown above by the construction of a simulator.
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